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Abstract 
Indigenous peoples have for many years struggled for recognition of their land 
and cultural rights at the domestic and international levels. The adoption of the 
United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (the Declaration) 
represents a significant shift in the way indigenous peoples are regarded 
internationally, outlining a range of individual and collective rights of indigenous 
peoples that are essential for their political, economic, social and cultural 
development. The Declaration, in particular, recognises indigenous rights to self-
determination, land, territory and resource rights, and free, prior and informed 
consent. It was these key provisions that saw Canada, Australia, New Zealand and the 
United States oppose the Declaration, notwithstanding the sizeable indigenous 
populations within their borders. This paper will assess these key provisions in 
relation to the objections of the opposing States, and will argue that their concerns in 
relation to these rights are unreasonable, exaggerated and dated. It will argue that 
consensus on the Declaration is achievable through processes of negotiation, dialogue 
and cooperation, and that giving recognition to the rights contained in the Declaration 
will not impact on these States to the extent that they claim, and that there is already 
evidence of State practice and opinio juris in relation to these rights. 
Word Length 
The text of this paper (excluding abstract, table of contents, footnotes, bibliography 
and appendix) comprises approximately 15830 words. 
Indigenous Peoples-United Nations-International Law 
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I INTRODUCTION 
After nearly 25 years of intense lobbying and negotiations over the rights of 
the world's indigenous peoples, the United Nations General Assembly (GA) finally 
adopted the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (the 
Declaration) on 13 September 2007 .
1 The Declaration is the most comprehensive and 
progressive of the international instruments dealing exclusively with the rights of 
indigenous peoples', providing protection for their traditional lands and resources, and 
to maintain their unique cultures and traditions. 
2 It represents the increased 
recognition by the United Nations (UN) of the world's estimated 370 million 
indigenous peoples as legitimate subjects of international law.
3 
Support for the Declaration has been overwhelming, with 143 countries voting 
m favour of the Declaration, 4 against and 11 abstentions. The four countries that 
voted against the Declaration are Canada, Australia, New Zealand and the United 
States (CANZUS). Each of these countries, built as they are on the colonisation and 
subjugation of the indigenous peoples who lived there, as well as the dispossession of 
their lands and resources, has sizeable indigenous populations within their borders 
who continue to press their claims for proper recognition of their land and cultural 
rights. The Declaration, therefore, with its ground-breaking provisions on self-
determination, land and resource rights, redress for past injustices and consultation 
rights, has potentially wide-ranging implications for these and other countries with 
indigenous peoples within their borders. 
Prior to the adoption of the Declaration, the indigenous struggle for equality 
and rights recognition had achieved only moderate success at the domestic level. 
While indigenous peoples have been effective in influencing change in domestic 
policies, legislation and redress for historical grievances, such developments often fall 
well short of the standards that indigenous peoples seek. As a result, indigenous 
groups and organisations throughout the world have increasingly appealed to the 
1 UNGA "The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples" (13 September 2007) 
UN Doc A/61 /L.67 [hereinafter "UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples"]. 
2 Claire Charters "The Road to the Adoption of the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples" 
(2007) 4 New Zealand Yearbook of International Law 121, 123. 
3 UNGA "General Assembly Adopts Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples" (13 September 
2007) GAtl 06 I 2 [hereinafter "UNGA Plenary Meeting ( I 3 September 2007)"]. 
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international community as a means of expressing their concerns, and have unified to 
form a strong worldwide indigenous rights movement. The international community 
over recent years has responded positively to indigenous demands, which has seen the 
increased recognition of indigenous peoples as legitimate subjects at international law 
as well as the development of international norms and international institutions. 
There are now a number of international human rights bodies with the specific 
mandate of protecting and developing the rights of indigenous peoples. 
The international focus on indigenous rights has also seen the development of 
a growing body of international human rights instruments, culminating most recently 
with the adoption of the Declaration. The increased recognition of indigenous rights 
internationally reflects the seriousness with which the international community views 
indigenous issues and the extent to which they are prepared to recognise evolving 
international norms. 
The adoption of the Declaration is a significant triumph for indigenous peoples 
as they continue their quest for recognition and acceptance of rights that are vital to 
their cultural development and survival. This paper will assess the impact of the 
Declaration on indigenous peoples, particularly in relation to the CANZUS States. 
The Declaration contains key indigenous rights to self-determination, land, territory 
and resource rights, and free, prior and informed consent. It was these key provisions 
that saw the CANZUS States oppose the Declaration, notwithstanding the sizeable 
indigenous populations within their borders. This paper will assess these key 
provisions in relation to the objections of the opposing States. It will argue that their 
concerns in relation to these rights are unreasonable, exaggerated and dated on the 
basis that recognising indigenous peoples' rights as outlined in the Declaration will 
not impact on the CANZUS States to the extent that they claim, and that there is 
already evidence of State practice and opinio juris in relation to these rights. It will 
also argue that consensus on the Declaration is achievable through processes of 
negotiation, dialogue and cooperation. 
Part II of this paper will look at how the recognition of indigenous rights at 
international law has evolved over time, from their historical denial under State-
centred approaches to international, to recognition under an international human 
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rights-centred regime. Part III will look at how the UN has responded to indigenous 
peoples' demands by recognising indigenous rights within a number of international 
instruments and forums, reflected most recently with the adoption of the Declaration. 
Part IV will look at the background to the Declaration and the process by 
which it was developed. Part V will then provide an overview of the Declaration, and 
will consider the impact of the Declaration for indigenous peoples, particularly in 
relation to the CANZUS States. It will also consider the application of international 
customary law in relation to individual provisions within the Declaration. It will 
argue that the application of customary international law may apply where there is 
evidence of State practice and opinio juris. 
Part VI will assess the key provisions on self-determination, land territory and 
resource rights, and free, prior and informed consent and the CANZUS States' 
objections to these rights. Part VI will argue that State concerns over these rights are 
exaggerated, unreasonable and dated. It will assert that a closer analysis of these 
provisions will show that State's concerns and fears over the application of these 
rights are unfounded, on the basis that they do not impact on States to the extent that 
they claim and that there is already evidence of State practice and opinio juris. Part 
VI will also consider the extent to which these rights are already accepted as 
indigenous rights and practiced within each of these States, thus providing evidence of 
international customary,. 
As a non-binding instrument, the Declaration should be seen as standard of 
achievement to be pursued in a spirit of partnership and mutual respect, not dissected 
as if it were legally binding. Part VII will look at how States can give effect to the 
Declaration. It will argue that States and indigenous peoples can reach mutually 
satisfactory outcomes through processes of dialogue, negotiation and cooperation. 
Part VII will also consider recent developments in Australia in relatior its indigenous 
peoples and their reversal towards the Declaration. It will consider what impact this 
may have for the remaining CANZUS States. 
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II INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AT INTERNATIONAL LAW 
The adoption of the Declaration represents the interpretation of fundamental 
rights in favour of indigenous peoples. It establishes positive standards of obligation 
for state and non-state actors in the international arena and represents that we are in a 
"time when international law speaks concretely to the issues of indigenous peoples 
around the world".4 It also represents progress in the attitudes of the international 
community towards indigenous peoples, which can be seen as an achievement for the 
persistence, patience and determination showed by indigenous groups and 
representatives in their continued appeals to the international arena. 
For many years indigenous peoples have struggled not only for the proper 
recognition and protection of their rights at the domestic and international levels, but 
they have also struggled to overcome the effects of colonisation, which caused 
significant loss of indigenous ancestral lands and resources, and serious damage to 
indigenous social, cultural and political systems, and way of life. Indigenous peoples 
have also suffered a significant loss of tribal autonomy as a result of the imposition of 
colonial control, which has often resulted in significant social, economic and cultural 
disparities between indigenous and non-indigenous peoples. Indigenous peoples are 
widely regarded as being among the most disadvantaged and vulnerable throughout 
the world. 5 
A State-Centred Approaches to International Law 
Indigenous rights are currently at the forefront of the international human 
rights agenda, as evidenced by the adoption of the Declaration, which represents a 
significant shift in the way indigenous peoples were represented and regarded 
historically at an international and domestic level. 6 
4 S. James Anaya, "Keynote Address: Indigenous Peoples and Their Mark on the International Legal 
System" (2006-2007) 3 I Am Indian L Rev 257, 257. 
5 UNGA Plenary Meeting ( 13 September 2007), above n 3. 
6 Alexandra Xanthaki Indigenous Rights and United Nations Standards: Self-Determination, Cul ture 
and Land (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2007) I. 
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The status of indigenous peoples at international law in contemporary times, 
particularly over the last quarter of the twentieth century, is vastly different to the way 
they were regarded during the colonial period of discovery, conquest and subsequent 
colonisation. During this period of European expansion into the 'new world', 
international law was instrumental in providing the legal mechanisms for the 
dispossession of indigenous peoples' lands and resources, and the denial of their 
rights. Rules such as "discovery", "conquest" and "terra nullius" made up the 
"doctrines of dispossession", 7 which provided the initial legal justification for the 
colonisation and domination of indigenous peoples and their lands and resources. 
After being denied justice and protection at home, indigenous peoples 
appealed to the international community for protection of their rights, which they 
believed stood for fair treatment and human rights.8 The first formal approach by 
indigenous peoples to the international community occurred in the early 1900s, when 
tribal representatives from Canada and New Zealand each made separate appeals to 
the international community for recognition of their collective rights, and to protest 
their treatment at home. 9 The international response, however, was limited by the 
prevailing view that international law was concerned solely with the rights and duties 
of states. The human rights of individuals and groups were not of international 
concern. 
Under the classic, state-centred approach, international law could only be 
created by nation-states; international law was primarily concerned with the 
regulation of affairs between and not above states; only nation-states could hold rights 
and obligations in the international arena; and states were protected from outside 
interference in the conduct of domestic affairs, including the treatment of indigenous 
peoples within states. 10 This positivist approach had a number of implications for 
indigenous peoples, including their status at international law. To enjoy rights as a 
7 World Conference against Racism www.un.org/WCAR (accessed 28 February 2008). 
8 Warren Allmand "The International Recognition of Indigenous Rights" (2005) 5 McGill Internation~I 
Review 34, 34. 
9 Ibid . 
1° Catherine J. lorns Magallanes "International Human Rights and their Impact on Domestic Law on 
Indigenous Peoples' Rights in Australia, Canada and New Zealand" in Paul Haveman (ed) Indigenous 
Peoples' Rights in A 11stralia, Canada and New Zealand (Oxford University Press, Auckland, 1999) 
235, 236. 
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group, indigenous peoples would have to be regarded as nations or States. Indigenous 
societies, however, struggled to satisfy the orthodox requirements of statehood 
because they did not fit within the European conception of nation-States. Indigenous 
societies were typically characterised by tribal or kinship ties, shared or overlapping 
spheres of territorial control and decentralised political structures. 11 As a result of 
their non-recognition as distinct sovereign groups, indigenous peoples were not able 
to participate in the shaping of international law, nor could they rely on international 
law to protect their interests. 
Having been denied possession and ownership of their ancestral lands and 
territories by international law, and the right to control their own lives, indigenous 
peoples were subsequently denied their rights of sovereignty and self-government. 
International law simply could not provide or cater to the notion of self-governing 
aboriginal societies within nation-States, whose social and political systems were 
vastly different from the orthodoxy of European civilisations. Furthermore, any 
treaties concluded between indigenous peoples and colonising states, which purported 
to uphold indigenous rights, including self-government, could simply be disregarded 
internationally as matters for domestic concern or invalid at international law since 
treaties could only be concluded between sovereign states. 12 Indigenous peoples were 
clearly not considered as possessing, or capable of possessing, sovereign authority at 
international law. The common view of colonising states and of the international 
community was that indigenous peoples were to be civilised, assimilated and 
integrated into mainstream society. Indigenous peoples were seen as incapable of 
controlling their own lands and destinies, which ha~ previously ensured their cultural 
survival and way of life for centuries. The loss of indigenous sovereignty and the 
dispossession of their lands and resources brought with it the near extinction of their 
languages and culture. The international legal system, focussed as it was on the rights 
11 S. James Anaya Indigenous Peoples in International Law (2 ed, Oxford University Press 1 New York1 
2004) 22. 
11 See for example, the Island of Pa/mas Case ( United States v Netherlands), 2 R.I.A.A. 829 ( 1928) 
831 at 858, which concluded that treaties entered into by the indigenous peoples and the Dutch East 
India Company were not "in the international law sense, treaties or conventions capable of creating 
rights and obligations such as may, in international law, arise out of treaties". See also, Iorns 
Magallanes, above n I 0, 236. 
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and obligations of states, remained inherently opposed to many of the demands of 
. d" 1 13 m 1genous peop es. 
B Early Recognition of Indigenous Rights at International Law 
From the mid-1950s, international institutions such as the International Labour 
Organisation (ILO) attempted to address the situation of the world's indigenous 
peoples. ILO Convention No. 107 (Convention No. 107), 14 for example, represented 
a shift in focus towards the situation of the world's indigenous peoples, but it also 
reflected the paternalistic attitudes of States and of the international community in the 
mid-l 900s towards indigenous peoples. It was the first international instrument 
dealing explicitly with the rights of indigenous peoples, although no indigenous group 
was involved in the drafting of this convention. This was reflected, as its title 
suggests, in its aim to further integrate and assimilate indigenous peoples with other 
citizens of the State. Convention No. 107 recognised that indigenous peoples had 
rights and interests that were distinct from those of other minorities, but contained no 
rights for indigenous peoples to exist as culturally distinct groups. 15 The paternalistic 
approach of Convention No. 107 failed to include indigenous peoples in the decision-
making processes and institutions that affected their lives and resources. The 
attitudinal approach of the 1950s and 1960s towards indigenous peoples reflected "a 
vision of equality that signified sameness, rather than diversity, and certainly had no 
room for the kind of diversity that would uphold indigenous peoples as robust, self-
governing communities" .16 
C A Human-Rights Centred Approach to International Law 
Despite their failure to gam proper recognition of their rights, indigenous 
peoples continued to press their claims for recognition at the domestic and 
international levels. While their protests at home had generated some change in 
domestic policy and legislation in the late 1900s, with bi-cultural and devolution 
13 Claire Charters "Indigenous Peoples and International Law and Policy" (2007) 18 PLR 22, 24. 
14 Convention Concerning the Protection and Integration of Indigenous and Other Tribal and Semi-
Tribal Populations in Independent Countries (No 107) (26 June 1957) International Labour 
Organisation 40th Session ( entry into force 2 June 1959). 
15 lorns, above n 10,237. 
16 Anaya, above n 4, 259 . 
11 
policies, as well as provisions for the redress of historical grievances, such changes 
often fell well short of indigenous aspirations to be self-determining. Their 
persistence in the international arena coincided with the international human rights 
and civil rights movements of the post-World War II era, which saw a shift away from 
the traditional state-centred role of international law to a human rights-centred 
approach, which included the greater protection of individuals and groups. The 
atrocities of the 2nd World War prompted a rethink of the virtually unlimited 
discretion of State power over its citizens, which saw the prioritisation of the human 
rights and self-determination of peoples by the UN. 17 
This shift opened the door to greater legal protections for non-state actors, 
including indigenous peoples. 18 Indigenous peoples throughout the world formed 
strong alliances, presenting a united international voice on indigenous issues. While 
there may not be consensus from the world's indigenous peoples on the range of 
issues that affect them, they have agreed on a minimum set of rights for the 
international community to recognise. 19 As Alexandra Xanthaki identifies, although 
indigenous peoples may have been excluded from the process of creating international 
laws, "they have refused to stand on its periphery and have been determined to 
become equal partners in its evolution".20 
The content of modem-day international law has been greatly influenced by 
the principles of equality, self-determination, non-discrimination and respect for the 
human rights and fundamental freedoms for all. Human rights laws protecting the 
rights of individuals and minority groups, including indigenous peoples, developed . 
further with the adoption of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(Universal Declaration),21 the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (ICESCR),22 and the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR). 23 Indigenous peoples seized upon the institutional and normative 
17 Siegfried W iessner "Rights and Status of Indigenous Peoples: A Global Comparative and 
International Analys is" (1999) 12 Harvard Human Rights Journal 59, 98 . 
1 Cha11ers, above n 13, 24 . 
19 Xanthaki , above n 6, 6. 
20 Ib id, 2. 
21 UNGA Reso lution 217 A (III ) ( 10 December 1948). 
22 Inte rnatio na l Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultura l Rights (16 December 1966) 993 U TS 3. 
23 Inte rnatio nal Covenant on Civ il and Politica l Rights ( I 9 December 1966) 999 UNTS 171 . 
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regime of human rights that was brought within the fold of the international legal 
system in the post-World War II era,24 grounding their demands on existing human 
rights principles. Article 27 of the ICCPR, for example, provides for, inter alia, the 
collective rights of ethnic minorities to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice 
their own religion, or to use their own language. Indigenous peoples have used this 
provision to seek greater recognition and protection of their right to enjoy their 
culture, which the UN Human Rights Committee (UNHRC) has interpreted to also 
include economic and social relations, including relations with land. 25 
From the 1970s onwards, international law has increasingly recognised 
indigenous peoples as distinct peoples with a set of well defined rights, reflecting a 
new generation of international consensus on indigenous peoples' rights.26 The ILO, 
for example, recognised the change in international standards and perceptions towards 
indigenous peoples since its adoption of Convention No. 107, and the inadequacy of 
its earlier standards. A committee of experts convened by the ILO recognised that the 
integrationist and assimilationist policies that were characteristic of the 1957 
Convention "no longer reflected current thinking". 27 The committee also identified 
that indigenous peoples should be allowed "as much control as possible over their 
own economic, social and cultural development", and to maintain their own 
lifestyles. 28 The ILO's revised standards towards indigenous peoples were 
incorporated into ILO Convention No. 169,29 which recognises a range of collective 
rights of indigenous "peoples",30 including rights to equality,31 non-discrimination,32 
culture, 33 and land and resource rights. 34 It is the only international treaty dealing 
exclusively with the rights of indigenous peoples, although it has only been ratified by 
1 7 States, which impacts on the influence that this Convention can have on States. 
24 Anaya, above n 11 , 7. 
25 Lubicon l ake v Canada , Communication No. 167/1 984, Annex IX.A ., UN GAOR, 45 th Session, 
Supp. No. 40, Vol. II UN Doc. N 45/40 (Oct 4 1990). 
26 Iorns, above n 10, 239. 
27 International Labour Organisation "Working Document for the Meeting of Experts on the Revision 
of the Indigenous and Tribal Populations Convention No. 107 (1-10 September 1986) 
APPL/MER/ 107/1 986/D7, 32 . 
28 Ibid. 
29 Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries (No 169) (27 June 
1989) International Labour Organisation 76th Session ( entry into force 5 September 1991 ). 
JO Ibid, Arti cle I (3) . 
3 1 Ibid, Article 2(2)(a). 
32 Ibid , Article 3(1 ). 
33 Ibid, Article 2(2)(b). 
34 Ib id, Articles 13-19 . 
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The increased focus on indigenous peoples and human rights since the 1950s 
has brought with it a "sustained level of international institutional activity focused 
upon indigenous peoples' concerns and a corresponding body of norms that build 
upon long-standing human rights precepts" .35 An impressive and growing body of 
international treaties, conventions, declarations and customary law reflects a new 
generation of international law that recognises and protects the rights and interests of 
indigenous peoples, representing a dramatic reversal in the way they were regarded 
traditionally at international law. 36 Indigenous peoples are now considered legitimate 
subjects of international law who, through a range of international bodies and forums, 
are able to play a greater role in the creation and development of international law as 
it pertains to them. 
D Other Challenges for Indigenous Peoples at International Law 
1 Identification 
In seeking protections at international law, the identification of indigenous 
peoples is a key issue. This can be a controversial issue, particularly where States 
may attempt to avoid fulfilling any obligations towards its indigenous peoples by 
denying or challenging the indigeneity of some groups.37 In most cases, however, 
identifying the world's indigenous peoples will not be an issue. They are invariably 
comprised of descendants of the pre-invasion inhabitants of lands now dominated by 
others, and are characterised by the social and economic disadvantage they experience 
relative to the rest of society as a result of historical forces that stripped them of their 
lands, resources, cultures and livelihood. 38 
To adopt a formal definition of 'indigenous peoples' would be complex, since 
"international law refrains from sharp and tight definitions that may limit the 
flexibility of applying instruments to different circumstances". 39 Moreover, it is the 
35 Anaya , above n 11 , 7. 
36 Rebecca Bratspies and Russell Miller "Introduction" (2006-2007) 31 Am Indian L Rev 253, 254. 
37 Xanthaki, above n 6, 9. 
38 Anaya, above n 11 , 3. 
39 Xa nthaki, above n 6, 9 . 
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characteristic right of peoples with aspirations of being self-determining to be able to 
define themselves, rather than be defined by others.40 
For practical reasons, however, the UN has adopted a working definition as 
put forward by the Martinez Cobo report,41 which provides that:42 
Indigenous communities, peoples and nations are those which, having a historical 
continuity with the pre-invasion and pre-colonial societies that developed on their 
territories, consider themselves distinct from other sectors of the societies now 
prevailing in those territories, or parts of them. They form at present non-dominant 
sectors of the society and are determined to preserve, develop and transmit to future 
generations their ancestral territories, and their ethnic identity, as the basis of their 
continued existence as peoples, in accordance with their own cultural patterns, social 
institutions and legal systems. 
The Declaration provides no formal definition or identification of indigenous 
peoples. While identification may be an issue in some regions of the world, the focus 
of this paper is concerned primarily with an analysis of the application of the 
Declaration to the CANZUS States. It will proceed on the basis that identification of 
indigenous groups within these States is not contested or denied. 
2 Collective rights of peoples 
The recognition of collective rights at international law is also a highly 
contested issue. International law has traditionally been concerned with the human 
rights of individuals. While indigenous peoples claim the protection of individual 
rights, they also seek recognition of their collective rights. For indigenous peoples, 
the protection of individual rights will often be achieved through the protection of 
collective rights. The recognition of collective rights is closely linked with the 
recognition of indigenous peoples as distinct cultures. As Kymlicka identifies:43 
40 Ibid. 
41 See discussion below, Part III, at n 43 . 
42 JM Cobo Study of the Problem of Discrimination against Indigenous Populations UN Doc 
EiC .4/Sub.2/1986/7/ Add.4. (United Nations, Geneva, 1986) paras 362-82. 
43 Will Kymlicka Liberalism, Community and Culture (Oxford University, Oxford, 1991) 124. 
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If we respect Indians as Indians, that is to say, as members of a distinct cultural 
community, then we must recognise the importance to them of their cultural heritage, 
and we must recognise the legitimacy of claims made by them for the protection of 
their culture. 
One of the main features of the Declaration is the recognition of collective 
rights. Indigenous rights to, inter alia, self-determination, culture, land, language and 
tribal membership are collective by nature. A denial of collective rights would 
essentially amount to a denial of culture and indigeneity. 
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III INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND THE UN SYSTEM 
Indigenous peoples throughout the world have successfully used the UN 
system as the main international forum for voicing their concerns and pressing their 
claims. The first significant step by the UN towards indigenous issues came in 1971 
with the appointment of Special Rapporteur Jose Martinez Cobo, who was 
commissioned to conduct a comprehensive study into the situation of the world's 
indigenous peoples. Martinez Cobo produced a number of reports to the Sub-
Commission of the UN Commission on Human Rights (Sub-Commission),
44 which 
concluded, inter alia, that indigenous peoples are separate peoples who have been 
denied their rights,45 and encouraged the opening of the UN to indigenous peoples.
46 
In response, the Sub-Commission established the Working Group on Indigenous 
Peoples (WGIP) in 1982, which was the first body in the international arena with the 
specific mandate to promote and protect the human rights and fundamental freedoms 
of indigenous peoples and to draft standards for their protection.
47 Other key 
developments within the UN include the establishment of the UN Permanent Forum 
on Indigenous Issues (PFII)48 and the appointment of the Special Rapporteur on the 
situation of the human rights and fundamental freedoms of indigenous peoples.
49 The 
establishment of the PFII is significant in that it provides an important meeting ground 
between governments and indigenous peoples, as well as between indigenous peoples 
themselves. 50 The appointment of the Special Rapporteur was made in response to 
the growing international concern regarding the marginalisation and discrimination 
against indigenous people worldwide. 
51 The Rapporteur's mandate is to strengthen 
the mechanisms of protection of the human rights of indigenous peoples. 
Better recognition of indigenous rights within the UN has also seen the 
increased use of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination 
44 Cobo, above n 42. 
45 Xanthaki, above n 6, 2. 
46 Allmand, above n 8, 35 . 
4 7 ECOSOC Resolution I 982/34 (7 May 1982) E/1982/82, 26. 
~
8 ECOSOC Resolution 2000/22 (28 July 2000) E/2000/22. 
49 UNCHR Resolution 2001 /57 (24 April 2001) E/C .4.Res.2001.57, para I. 
50 Wiessner, above n 17, 124. 
51 UNCHR Resolution 2001 /57 (24 April 2001) E/CN.4.Res.2001.57, para I. 
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(CERD)52 and the UNHRC53 by indigenous peoples. The growing number of bodies 
on indigenous issues demonstrates the increasing importance that the UN, and 
ultimately the international community, currently places on the recognition and 
protection of indigenous peoples.
54 It also demonstrates the faith that indigenous 
peoples have placed in the UN to recognise and protect their rights. This is reflected 
most recently with the adoption of the Declaration. The Declaration is significant, not 
just in terms of what it represents for indigenous peoples, but also in terms of its 
implications for States and the international community. The process by which the 
Declaration was developed also indicates the inclusive nature of the UN process, 
which allowed the interaction of indigenous and other non-state actors. It signifies the 
acceptance of emerging international norms concerning indigenous peoples by the 
international community, and reflects how far international law has come in 
recognising and protecting the rights of indigenous peoples. 
52 See fo r example, UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination "Decision 1(66): New 
Zealand" (27 April 2005) CERD/C/DEC/NZL/ 1; UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial 
Disc rimination "Concluding Observations : New Zealand" ( 15 August 2007) CERD/C/NZL/C0/17. 
53 See fo r example, l ove/ace v Canada, Communication No 24/1 977 (30 July 1981) 
CCPR/C/13 /024/1 977; Apirana Mah uika v New Zealand, Communication No 547/1 993; "Report of 
the Human Rights Committee" (15 November 2000) CCPR/C/70/D/547/ 1993 . 
54 Xanthak i, above n 6, 5. 
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IV HOW THE DECLARATION CAME TO BE 
The lengthy process of the Declaration began in 1982 with the establishment 
of the WGIP. For nearly a decade, from 1984 to 1993, the WGIP worked towards a 
draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. The chairperson, Erica-Irene 
Daes, found that it would be unethical for the UN to develop the Declaration without 
the active role of indigenous peoples.
55 The GA also encouraged the participation of 
indigenous representatives in the drafting process, which coincided with the first 
International Decade of the World's Indigenous People - further evidence of the UN's 
concern for the situation of indigenous peoples throughout the world. 
56 In dedicating 
an International Decade to indigenous peoples the UN hoped to strengthen 
international cooperation to improve the economic, social and cultural situation of the 
world's indigenous peoples.
57 
Opening the drafting process of the Declaration to indigenous peoples allowed 
them to negotiate with States and make interventions and recommendations on the 
text of the Declaration. As a result of the relaxed rules of participation and 
enthusiasm among participants, the WGIP attracted up to 700 individuals and grew to 
be one of the largest regular human rights meetings organised by the UN.
58 
The draft Declaration was completed by the WGIP in 1993, and was adopted 
by the Sub-Commission in 1994,
59 who then reported it back to their parent body, the 
UN Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR). A Working Group on the draft 
Declaration (WGDD) was formed by the UNCHR to further elaborate the Draft.
60 It 
was here that the text of the Declaration was fiercely negotiated between States and 
indigenous peoples.
61 The draft Declaration was finally adopted by the WGDD at the 
55 Aroha Mead "The Adoption of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples" 
(Paper presented to the Victoria Management School, Victoria University of Wellington, 25 September 
2007). 
56 UNGA "International Decade of the World's Indigenous People" (23 December 1994) 
A/RES/49/214. 
57 Ibid. 
58 Xanthaki, above n 6, I 02 . 
59 Sub-Commiss ion on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities Resolution 1994/45 
(26 August 1994) E/CN.4/SUB.2/RES/1 994/45, para 4(a). 
6° Commiss ion on Human Rights Resolution 1995/32 (3 March I 995) E/CN.4/RES/1 995/32/, I. 
61 Claire Charters "The Road to the Adoption of the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples" 
(2007) 4 NZYBIL 121 , 122 . 
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beginning of 2006.
62 The UNCHR was replaced in 2006 by the UNHRC.
63 This 
signalled a significant change for indigenous peoples because the UNHRC sits 
alongside the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) rather than under it, and 
reports directly to the GA, and is thus higher up in the UN hierarchy.
64 In its first 
substantive decision, the UNHRC adopted the revised version of the Declaration later 
that year, and referred it to the GA for adoption in 2006. The GA, however, voted to 
defer the adoption of the Declaration at the request of Namibia,
65 on behalf of a group 
of African governments, who proposed that consideration of the Declaration be 
deferred to allow time for further consultations.
66 These delegations had expressed 
concerns about the self-determination provisions and its potential effects on national 
sovereignty, territorial integrity and land rights.
67 Supporters of the Declaration 
expressed concerns that this deferral was an attempt to delay and even jettison the 
adoption of the Declaration by the GA, which left the status of the Declaration at the 
end of 2006 on uncertain ground. 
68 The Declaration, however, went before the GA 
again on 13 September 2007 where it was finally adopted, nearly 25 years after its 
commencement. 
62 ECOSOC "Report of the Working Group Established in Accordance with Commission on H
uman 
Rights Resolution 1995/32 of 3 March 1995 on its Eleventh Session" (22 Marc
h 2006) 
E/CN.4/2006/79, para 27. 
03 UNHRC Resolution 2006/2 (30 June 2006) A/HRC/ 1/L. I 0, 57. 
64 Charters , above n 13, 36. 
65 UNGA Reso lution 61/178 (20 December 2006) A/Res/61/178, para 1. 
66 Ibid, para 2. 
67 UNGA "Concluding Considera tions of the Third Committee's Reports, General Assembly
" (20 
December 2006) GA/I 0563. 
68 Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the orth www.npolar.no/ (accessed I O January
 
2008). 
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V THE DECLARATION ON THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES 
The adoption of the Declaration as an international human rights instrument is 
a significant achievement, reflecting the increased attention of indigenous peoples at 
international law and the improved interaction between state and non-state actors. It 
also represents a step forward in the promotion and protection of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms for all. The Declaration is an authoritative statement of 
emerging international norms concerning indigenous peoples on the basis of generally 
applicable human rights principles.
69 The lengthy process by which the Declaration 
was developed demonstrates the durability and fundamental nature of the rights and 
principles contained therein. Extensive deliberations and intense debates between 
states, indigenous representatives and UN authorities enhance its authoritativeness 
and legitimacy. 
70 The escalation of the Declaration through the UN hierarchy, from 
its lowest point at the WGIP through to its adoption by the GA, also demonstrates the 
durability and fundamental nature of the rights contained therein.
71 
The Declaration consists of 24 preambular paragraphs and 46 operative 
provisions, which deal with a range of individual and collective rights of indigenous 
peoples, including rights to self-determination,
72 autonomy and self-govemment,
73 
equality,74 land and resource rights,
75 redress,76 traditional knowledge and intellectual 
property rights,77 culture,
78 education,79 language,
80 the transmission of education and 
media in their own languages,
81 consultation,82 as well as recognition of indigenous 
peoples' distinct political, legal, economic, social and cultural institutions.
83 
Indigenous peoples also have the right not to be subjected to forced assimilation or 
69 Anaya, above n 11, 65. 
70 Ibid. 
7 1 PG Mc Hugh Aboriginal Societies and the Common Law: A History of Sovereignty, Status, and Self 
determination (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2004) 299. 
72 UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, above n I, Article 3. 
73 Ibid, Article 4. 
74 Ibid, Article 46(3) . 
75 Ibid, Articles 25 and 26. 
76 Ibid, Article 8(2). 
77 Ibid, Article 31. 
78 Ibid, Article 11. 
79 Ibid, Articles 14, 15, 17 and 21. 
80 Ibid, Article 13. 
81 Ibid , Articles 14 and I 6. 
82 Ibid, Articles 15 , I 7, 29, 36 and 38. 
83 Ibid, Article 5 
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destruction of their culture,
84 or to be forcibly removed from their lands or 
territories. 85 The stated rights are guaranteed to indigenous peoples as individual and 
collective rights, not just as individual rights. 
86 
The Declaration covers the gaps in existing international law on indigenous 
rights, unifying international norms on indigenous peoples' rights under a single, 
comprehensive UN instrument, which is widely accepted by the world's States as a 
standard to attain. Its provisions largely reflect the views of indigenous peoples, as 
well as a degree of States' opinio juris, thus providing "evidence of crystallising 
customary international Jaw on indigenous peoples' rights. "
87 
Regarding the nature of the Declaration, States repeatedly emphasised that the 
Declaration is an aspirational instrument with political and moral value, but is not a 
legally binding document. As an aspirational document, it recognises indigenous 
peoples' rights and establishes an appropriately high standard for States and 
indigenous peoples to work towards, which could well form the further development 
of international law on indigenous peoples' rights in the future.
88 The onus 1s on 
States to take responsibility for the particular issues that affect their indigenous 
communities and to reflect the needs and circumstances of that particular region in 
addressing those issues.
89 The Declaration is framed as a "standard of achievement to 
be pursued in a spirit of partnership and mutual respect,
1190 which requires States to 
take "appropriate measures, including legislative measures, to achieve the ends of this 
Declaration. "91 In addressing the historical grievances and present needs of 
indigenous peoples, States (representing the needs of all of its citizens) and 
indigenous communities need to work towards effective and pragmatic solutions. For 
84 Ibid, Article 8 
85 Ibid, Article 10 
86 See for example, ibid, Article 1. The importance of collective indigenous rights is reinforced 
throughout the Declaration, with its reference to the collective rights of indigenous peoples being 
indispensable to their existence, well-being and integral development as peoples; see ibid, Preamble. 
87 Claire Charters "The Rights of Indigenous Peoples" (2006) NZLJ 335, 336. 
88 Claire Charters "Maori and the United Nations" in Maria Bargh (ed) Resistance: An Indigenous 
Response to Neo/iberalism (Huia Publishers, Wellington, 2007) 147, 150. 
89 Preambular paragraph 23 of the Declaration recognises that the situation of indigenous peoples 
"varies from region to region and from country to country and that the significance of national and 
regional particularities and various historical and cultural backgrounds should be taken into 
consideration". 
90 UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, above n I , Preamble. 
91 Ibid , Article 38. 
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such arrangements to be durable and effective it is important that the Declaration not 
be too prescriptive in the actions that States should take. The Declaration sets the 
standard to attain while remaining sufficiently broad for each country to adapt to their 
particular circumstances. It is intended that the Declaration take its place with the 
other international instruments - some in the form of treaties and some in declaratory 
form - which together set international standards for the observance of human 
rights. 92
 
Discussions between States and indigenous communities should therefore 
occur within a framework of dialogue, negotiation and cooperation, and with a 
broader focus of relationship-building rather than focussing strictly on the legal rights 
of each party. That way, reconciling the interests of each party is not so much about 
resolving the past but of working out how to live together.
93 
Unfortunately, some States have dissected and opposed the Declaration as if it 
were a legally binding treaty.
94 The Declaration contains key provisions on self-
determination, lands, territory and resource rights, and free, prior and informed 
consent. The content of these provisions is what ultimately saw the CANZUS States 
oppose the adoption of the Declaration. Part VI of this paper will discuss these key 
provisions, and the objections of the opposing States. It will argue that the concerns 
of the opposing States over these particular provisions were exaggerated and 
unreasonable, and that it was possible for States and indigenous peoples to reach 
satisfactory outcomes on the rights contained in the Declaration. 
In explanation of their vote against the Declaration, it was noted that the 
CANZUS States purported to express their positive commitment to indigenous rights 
domestically and internationally and to their hopes of agreeing on a meaningful 
Declaration, before proceeding to oppose the Declaration in its entirety. In 
explanation of their vote, the United States (US) did not make any express objections 
to any specific provisions of the Declaration. The US was more concerned with the 
92 Ali son Quentin-Baxter "Introduction" in Ali son Quentin-Baxter (ed) Recognising the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples (Victoria Uni versity of Wellington, Wellington, 1998) ix, ix. 
93 Ma tthew S R Palmer "The International Practice" in Alison Quentin-Baxter (ed) Recognising the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples (Victoria Uni versity of Wellington, Wellington, 1998) 87, 89. 
94 Allmand , above n 8, 39. 
23 
overall process and language of the Declaration, which they found to be confusing, 
unclear and unacceptable. As a result, the US felt that the Declaration could not enjoy 
universal support and become a true standard of achievement. 
A The Application of Customary International Law 
Although the Declaration is not binding, its status as a declaration, however, 
attributes to it a level of importance comparable with the Universal Declaration. 
While these instruments are not binding per se, they are nevertheless influential in the 
development of international norms, and are reflective of international consensus on 
the basic rights of people. Moreover, individual provisions may be binding if they 
can be categorised as customary international law. 
In assessmg the objections of the CANZUS States to each of the key 
provisions of the Declaration, this paper will consider the extent to which these rights 
are already accepted by the CANZUS States and exercised by indigenous peoples, 
thus providing evidence of customary international law. Australia argued that the 
Declaration does not constitute "evidence of the evolution of customary international 
law", 95 but as Anaya and Wiessner identify, the distinct body of customary 
international law concerning indigenous peoples, as contained in the Declaration, had 
formed long before it was adopted, and that voting against the Declaration does not 
necessarily invalidate claims to the customary international law character of 
individual components of the Declaration, or of the principles contained within it.
96 
Part VI of this paper, therefore, will also consider whether indigenous rights of self-
determination, land rights, and consultation and consent rights are already regarded as 
norms of international customary law. 
1 Establishing customary international law norms 
In order to establish a norm of customary international law the ICJ held that 
State practice must be "carried out in such a way as to be evidence of a belief that this 
95 GA Plenary Meeting ( 13 September 2007), above n 3. 
96 S. James Anaya & Siegfried Wiessner "The UN Dec laration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: 
Towards Re-empowerment" www.jurist.law. pitt.edu/ (accessed 15 January 2008). 
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practice is rendered obligatory by the rule of law requiring it" .
97 In order to establish 
international customary law, there must be widespread and representative State 
practice in support of a particular norm, as well as a degree of States' opinio juris. 
In claiming rights under the Declaration indigenous peoples may be able to 
point to certain provisions of the Declaration as customary international law. As a 
non-binding instrument it may be necessary for indigenous peoples to look at whether 
the right in question might be enforceable as an international customary law norm, 
regardless of whether the State signed the Declaration or not. Although 143 countries 
signed the Declaration there may be some countries who have little intention of 
actually giving effect to it. Other countries may have the political will to support the 
Declaration, but their may be greater legal or logistical hurdles to overcome in giving 
effect to it. There could, however, be a stronger case of opinio juris for those States 
that signed the Declaration. Finding ways of upholding the rights and principles 
within the Declaration will be an important step for all States and indigenous groups. 
97 North Sea Co11ti11enta / She/f(FRC/Den; FRC/Neth [1969] 169 ICJ Rep 3, 44. 
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VI KEY PROVISIONS OF THE DECLARATION 
A Self-Determination 
Perhaps the most central (and contentious) issue in relation to indigenous 
rights, not just in terms of the Declaration, but throughout the entire indigenous rights 
movement, is the right of indigenous self-determination. Indigenous peoples have 
consistently pressed for recognition of their right to self-determination, which they 
have understood to be a right to freely determine their own political status and freely 
pursue their economic, social and cultural development. Indigenous groups assert that 
as 'peoples' they have an inherent right to self-determination, in that they have an 
inherent right to control their own destinies. 
98 Self-determination, as an expression of 
sovereignty, emanates from the unique identity and culture of peoples and is therefore 
an inherent and inalienable right of peoples.
99 As an inherent right, its existence does 
not rely on a grant, transfer or other similar act of recognition by the State. Rather, it 
is sourced in the collective lives, laws and traditions of indigenous communities, and 
in the fact of their prior occupation and sovereignty. 
100 It does, however, rely on the 
State to acknowledge the original sovereignty of indigenous peoples and relinquish 
some of its control over indigenous communities. States and non-indigenous peoples, 
however, have struggled to understand or accept the basis of indigenous sovereignty 
and how it might apply within modem social and political structures. 
Support for recognising indigenous self-determination is based on a number of 
grounds. Firstly, indigenous peoples existed as distinct communities who exercised 
sovereign authority and control over their lands and people before the Europeans 
arrived. In the post-settler phase, indigenous peoples usually did not fully consent to 
98 Catherine Iorns Magallanes "A New Zealand Case Study: Child Welfare" in Alison Quentin-Baxter 
(ed) Recognising the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (Victoria University of Wellington, Wellington, 
1998) 132, 167. 
99 Joanne Barker "For Whom Sovereignty Matters" in Joanne Barker (ed) Sovereignty Matters: 
Locations of Co11testation and Possibility in Indigenous Struggles for Self Determination (University of 
Nebraska Press, Lincoln and London, 2005) 3. See also, Moana Jackson, "He Waka Eke Noa: A 
Report for the Faculty of Law, Victoria University of Wellington" (Wellington, 1997) 93 . 
100 Sonia Ha1Tis-Short "Self-Government in Canada: A Successful Model for the Decolonisation of 
Aboriginal Child Welfare" in Stephen Tierney (ed) Accommodating Cultural Diversity (Ashgate 
Publishing Limited, Hampshire, 2007) 99, I 03. 
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outside governance, 
101 nor was there a legitimate transferral of power from indigenous 
peoples to the State. 
102 With the onset of colonisation, some indigenous communities 
attempted to preserve their sovereignty by entering into treaties with the colonising 
State, while the sovereignty of other indigenous communities was simply regarded as 
"non-existent". 
103 Secondly, in attempting to reduce inequities between indigenous 
and non-indigenous peoples as a result of colonisation, indigenous peoples want to be 
able to control their own affairs according to their traditional cultural practices. 
Providing for indigenous self-determination is based on the pragmatic recognition that 
indigenous systems could hardly fail to be more productive than existing Western 
systems. 104 The third ground is based on the quest for cultural survival, which is at 
the heart of indigenous claims to self-determination. Indigenous peoples claim to be 
distinct cultural entities with distinct cultures who demand the right to preserve and 
maintain their own cultural survival; in other words, cultural self-determination. 
105 
Indigenous peoples can ensure their cultural survival and development where they are 
free to exist as distinct entities. 
106 Indigenous representatives have repeatedly stressed 
that the recognition of their right to self-determination is essential for their cultural 
survival and development.
107 Cultural integrity and cultural survival, therefore, 
hinges on the right of indigenous peoples to exercise self-determination within the 
framework of existing state structures. 
In providing for indigenous self-determination within contemporary societies, 
the question then becomes one of how indigenous peoples, who were previously fully 
self-determining and who still claim and have memory of self-determination, can be 
restored to being fully self-determining in the present.
108 
101 Mark Bennett "Indigeneity as Self-Determination" (2005) 4 Indigenous Law Journal 75, 79. 
102 Charters, above n 88, 159. 
103 Aboriginal political and social structures were regarded as being "so low on the scale of social 
organisation" at the time of European colonisation that it is as if their sovereign rights were non-
existent; see, Mabo v Queensland ( 1992) 107 ALR 1, 28 (HCA). 
104 John Pratt "Assimilation, Equality and Sovereignty in New Zealand/Aotearoa: Maori and the Social 
Welfare and Criminal-Justice Systems" in Paul Haveman (ed) Indigenous Peoples' Rights in Australia, 
Canada and New Zealand (Oxford University Press, Auckland, 1999) 316, 326. 
105 lorns Magallanes, above n 98, 132. 
106 Brian Goehring Indigenous Peoples of the World: An Introduction to their Past, Present, and Future 
(2 ed, Purich Publishing, Saskatchewan, 1993) 59. 
107 UN Commission on Human Rights Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and 
Protection of Minorities "Report of the Working Group on Indigenous Populations on its First Session" 
(25 August 1982) EiC .4/sub.2/1982/33 , para 70. 
108 Bennett, above n 101 , 79. 
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States are increasingly acknowledging historical wrongs committed against 
indigenous peoples during and subsequent to the colonial seizure of indigenous lands, 
and are exploring ways of addressing their past. The growing body of international 
law and academic literature on indigenous self-determination provides evidence that 
self-determination is increasingly recognised as a 'right' that belongs to indigenous 
peoples, and is the main priority for indigenous claims. The content and scope of 
indigenous self-determination, however, remains unclear and highly contested, with 
both indigenous peoples and States presenting opposing claims.
109 Indigenous 
peoples want greater control over their own political, social, cultural and economic 
futures . For indigenous peoples, self-determination includes rights such as autonomy 
over lands and resources, tribal self-government, political representation at a national 
level, and independence. On the other hand, States and non-indigenous peoples want 
to ensure that their territorial integrity and political unity remains unaffected. 
Reconciling the two competing positions has been a significant challenge for all 
concerned. The issue is further complicated by varying conceptions of sovereignty, 
citizenship, autonomy, nationhood and culture.
110 
1 Self-determination as a general human right 
The self-determination of peoples as a general right is widely acknowledged as 
a principle of customary international law and even jus cogens, a peremptory norm.
111 
Its basis as an international norm is sourced in the framework of fundamental human 
rights, and has been accepted as an international law right pertaining to all peoples. 
Article 1 of the Charter of the United Nations (the UN Charter), for example, provides 
that one of the purposes of the UN is "to develop friendly relations among nations 
based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples". 
This purpose is further elaborated under Articles 55 and 56 of the Charter, which 
affirms the fundamental importance and respect for the principles of equal rights and 
self-detem1ination of peoples. The self-determination of peoples is also affirmed 
under Common Article 1 of the ICESCR and the ICCPR, which provides that "all 
peoples have the right to self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely 
109 Catherine M Brti lmann and Maij oleine Y A Zieck "Some Remarks on the Draft Dec laration on the 
Rights of Indi genous Peoples" ( 1995) 8 LJIL 103, 109. 
110 Bennett , above n IO I , 77. 
111 Anaya , above n 11 , 97. 
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determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural 
development." Its standing as a 'principle' under the UN Charter has developed to 
being recognised as a 'right' under the International Covenants. Its inclusion within the 
International Covenants recognises that self-determination is not a right created by 
treaty, but one that already exists as an international human rights norm.
112 
2 Self-determination as an indigenous right 
The UN has recognised the particular situation of colonised peoples, including 
that of indigenous peoples, and their need for self-determination, and regards self-
determination not only as a fundamental right for colonised peoples but also as a 
necessary step in the decolonisation process. Under the 1960 Declaration on the 
Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (the 1960 
Declaration), 11 3 the UN proclaimed that recognising self-determination as a right of 
peoples is a necessary step in bringing a "speedy and unconditional end [to] 
colonialism in all its forms and manifestations" .
114 Article 1 of the 1960 Declaration 
provides that "the subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination and 
exploitation" is contrary to the UN Charter and is regarded as a "denial of 
fundamental human rights", while Article 2 affirms that "all peoples have the right to 
self-determination; by virtue of that right they freely determine their political status 
and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development". In the Western 
Sahara (Advisory Opinion), the International Court of Justice (ICJ) recognises self-
determination as a general rule of international law on the basis of its inclusion in the 
international human rights instruments, and acknowledges the role that self-
determination plays in the decolonisation process.
115 
The 1970 Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly 
Relations and Cooperation among States (the 1970 Declaration) also recognises the 
principles of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and provides that States 
112 Elena Cirkov ic "Self-Determination and Indigenous Peoples in International Law" (2006-2007) 3 1 
Am Indian L Rev 375, 386. 
113 
1 GA Resolution 1514 (XV) (14 December 1960) . 
114 Ibid, Preamble. 
11 5 Western Sahara (Advisory Opinion) [ 1975] ICJ Rep I 2, 3 1 paras 54-59 Judgment of the majority. 
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have a duty to promote this principle.
116 It upholds the principles of equal rights, self-
determination and decolonisation in the same language as the Charter and the other 
international instruments, under the proviso that: 
117 
Nothing in the foregoing paragraphs shall be construed as authorising or encouraging 
any action which would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial 
integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent States conducting themselves 
in compliance with the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples as 
described above and thus possessed of a government representing the whole people 
belonging to the territory without distinction as to race, creed or colour. 
The 1970 Declaration upholds the territorial integrity and political unity of States on 
the condition that States recognise the equal rights and self-determination of peoples, 
without distinction as to race, creed or colour. Indigenous peoples would clearly fall 
within this category. A State that recognises the equal rights and self-determination 
of indigenous peoples, along with the rights of other citizens, will be reflected in a 
representative government that accommodates the needs and interests of indigenous 
peoples. Where States fail to recognise or apply these rights, the limitations of 
territorial integrity and political unity may no longer apply, which may justify wider 
claims of self-determination, including secession.
118 The 1970 Declaration is 
particularly instructive in the discourse on self-determination in that it sheds some 
light on the content of the right of self-determination, in particular the need for 
indigenous interests to be represented within government. Brolrnann and Zieck 
identify, however, that indigenous participation in democratic government "seems 
predominantly geared to preserving the indigenous autonomy".
119 Alison Quentin-
Baxter also asserts that majority rule within non-homogenous States is "an inadequate 
way of protecting the interests of minority and most other non-dominant groups".
120 
Protecting the rights and interests of indigenous peoples, and recognising their 
116 John B Henriksen "Implementation of the Right of Self-Detemlination oflndigenous Peoples within 
the Framework of Human Security" International Conference on Indigenous Peoples' Self-
Determination and the Nations State in Asia (Baguio, Philippines, 18-21 April 1999). 
117 UNGA Resolution 2625 (XXV) (24 October 1970) AIRES/2625, 124 (emphasis added). 
118 Brolmann and Zieck, above n 109, 107. 
I 
19 [bid, [ 06. 
110 Alison Quentin-Baxter "The International and Constitutional Law Contexts" in Alison Quentin-
Baxter ( ed) Recog11ising the Rights of !11digenous Peoples (Victoria University of Wellington, 
Wellington, l 998) 22, 30. 
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inherent right to control their own lives can only really be achieved by empowering 
indigenous communities. This means self-determination. 
3 Self-determination under the Declaration 
Self-determination was the source of extensive discussions and intense debate 
throughout the drafting process.
121 Indigenous representatives ensured that the right 
of self-determination remained central to the Declaration, arguing that the right to 
self-determination was a prerequisite for the enjoyment of all other human rights and 
fundamental freedoms.
122 Indigenous peoples repeatedly stressed that they could not 
accept the Declaration without recognising this right, 
123 asserting that without 
agreement on self-determination it would be difficult to reach consensus on the other 
prov1s1ons. 124 Self-determination is perceived as the right on which all other rights 
depend. 125 
Indigenous representatives successfully argued for the inclusion of a right to 
self-determination in the Declaration. Under Article 3 of the Declaration, "indigenous 
peoples have the right to self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely 
determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural 
development." The guarantee of self-determination under the Declaration mirrors the 
language of Common Article 1 of the International Covenants, indicating the parity at 
international Jaw between the indigenous right of self-determination and the general 
right of self-determination of peoples. It also acknowledges its collective application 
to peoples as well as individuals. 
Article 4 of the Declaration elaborates on the content of this right, providing 
that "indigenous peoples, in exercising their right to self-determination, have the right 
to autonomy or self-government in matters relating to their internal and local affairs, 
121 See for example, UN Commission on Human Rights "Report of the working group established in 
accordance with Commission on Human Rights resolution 1995/32" (6 December 1999) 
E/CN.4/2000/84, paras 42-85 [hereinafter "Report of the 1999 session of the Commission Working 
Group'']. 
122 Ibid, para 44 . 
123 Xanthaki, above n 6, I 09. 
124 Report of the 1999 session of the Commission Working Group, above n 121, para 44. 
125 Quentin-Baxter, above n 120, 28. 
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as well as ways and means for financing their autonomous functions". This provision 
provides the first reference in an international instrument to a 'right to autonomy', 
126 
and clearly limits the exercise of indigenous self-determination to matters relating to 
their internal and local affairs. 
(a) Internal self-determination 
Internal self-determination is limited to the collective rights of indigenous 
peoples to autonomous self-government within the state, whereas external self-
determination can include a right of secession.
127 States consistently argued that any 
exercise of indigenous self-determination should be limited to the internal aspects of 
the right, as opposed to an external expression of self-determination in order to protect 
and maintain their territorial integrity and political unity. Under the Declaration, the 
scope of indigenous self-determination is therefore limited to autonomous acts of self-
government in relation to their tribal affairs, and does not include the option of 
secession. Preambular paragraph seventeen of the Declaration provides that any right 
to self-determination must be exercised in conformity with international law. This is 
confirmed under Article 46(1) of the Declaration, which prevents groups from doing 
anything that would be contrary to the UN Charter or that would dismember or 
impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and 
independent States. An act of secession would be contrary to Article 2 of the UN 
Charter, which upholds the territorial integrity and political unity of States. 
Moreover, under Article 46(2) of the Declaration, the exercise of any rights under the 
Declaration must respect the rights and freedoms of others and not be harmful to 
democratic society. Any act of secession will likely have a significant impact on 
democratic society and on the rights and freedoms of others, particularly where non-
indigenous or non-tribal citizens live within or possess lands in contested territories . 
In recognising indigenous self-determination, States will also want to guard against 
the demands of minority or separatist movements and other special groups who may 
make similar demands for rights recognition. 
126 Xanthak i, above n 6, 111. 
1'7 - Iorns Maga llanes, above n 98, 135 . 
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Self-determination is paramount among the rights of indigenous peoples, but 
most indigenous groups do not interpret this as a right to statehood, nor are they 
interested in seceding.
128 Throughout the drafting process, indigenous delegations 
confirmed that they were not interested in seceding, and were prepared to offer 
assurances to that effect.
129 Indigenous peoples see self-determination as meaning the 
ability to control their own cultural and economic destinies within existing state 
structures. 13° For indigenous peoples, self-determination really means "entitlement of 
indigenous groups to make decisions about their economic, social and cultural 
development without unwarranted interference by the state".
131 They want to be in 
control of their own lives and destinies. 
In explanation of their vote against the Declaration, Australia was the only 
opposing country to express concerns over self-determination, with fears that a right 
to self-determination could amount to a right to secession. The Australian 
government noted that they could not encourage action that might "impair, even in 
part, the territorial and political integrity of a State with a system of democratic 
representative Government." 
132 Australia's lone voice on this issue was surprising 
given the ongoing debate over this issue. New Zealand, for example, has consistently 
objected to an indigenous peoples' right to self-determination, which it also feared 
could give indigenous peoples an unqualified right to secede.
133 Canada, on the other 
hand stated in 1999 that they "accepted a right of self-determination for indigenous 
peoples that respected the political, constitutional and territorial integrity of 
democratic States". 134 Given their earlier support of the Declaration, it was surprising 
that Canada would subsequently vote against the adoption of the Declaration. 
The notion of indigenous secession has been a common concern among States. 
It appears, however, that States' fears of self-determination under the Declaration, 
128 Patrick Thornberry "Images of Autonomy and Individual and Collective Rights in International 
Insm1ments on the Rights of Minorities" in Marku Suksi (ed) Autonomy: Applications and Implications 
(Kluwer Law International, The Hague, 1998) 97, 119. 
129 Report of the 1999 session of the Commission Working Group, above n 121, para 85. 
130 Paul Keal "Indigenous Self-Determination and the Legitimacy of Sovereign States" (2007) 44 
International Politics 287, 288 . 
131 Frank Brennan One Land One Nation: Mabo - Towards 2001 (University of Queensland Press, St 
Lucia, 1995) 148-149. 
132 lJ\fGA Plenary Meeting ( 13 September 2007), above n 3. 
133 Chai1ers, above n 87, 336. 
134 Report of the Commission Working Group, above n 121, para 50. 
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which might include a right of secession, are exaggerated and unreasonable. 
Indigenous delegations emphasised throughout the drafting process that they were not 
interested in seceding, and the Declaration clearly does not allow for secession. 
Moreover, there seems to be a double standard in this debate when States are able to 
freely re-define their own constitutional arrangements while blocking indigenous 
aspirations of being self-determining, fearing that indigenous peoples will break away 
from the State. Australia and New Zealand, for example, have both entertained the 
notion of becoming a republic and thus breaking away from the Commonwealth, with 
Australia holding a national referendum in 1999.
135 As independent nation-States, 
moves towards Australian or New Zealand independence from the Commonwealth 
are not to be equated necessarily with indigenous secession. A republicanism 
movement would nevertheless have a significant impact on indigenous peoples. 
Maori, for example, would be greatly affected by moves towards New Zealand 
becoming a republic, especially since their Treaty of Waitangi agreement is with the 
British Crown. What protections will remain for Maori under the Treaty within a 
newly formed republic? Will the Treaty still be applicable? 
It seems that States are able to re-define their own constitutional arrangements 
free of the paternalistic constraints that they have displayed towards indigenous 
peoples, who simply want greater control over their own affairs and live according to 
their own customs. States are able to fully determine their own status while 
indigenous peoples, who were previously fully self-determining, are not. States 
continue to adhere to the absolutist notion of parliamentary sovereignty while 
remaining "unaccountably anxious" about how indigenous peoples see themselves 
within the constitutional framework.
136 The Rt Hon Dame Sian Elias suggests that a 
fixation on parliamentary sovereignty to the exclusion of wider perspectives is 
"impoverishing our constitutional thinking", 
137 and that it is time we considered our 
constitutional arrangements "without distorting them through the lens of 
command". 138 Indigenous peoples have legitimate claims for self-determination. 
They should be able to negotiate their claims without being trumped by monolithic 
135 See for example, The 1999 Australian Referendum, 6 November 1999; (8 March 1994) 539 NZPD 
121. 
136 Rt Hon Dame Sian Elias Gr ZM "Sovereignty in the 21st Century: Another Spin on the Merry-Go-
Round" (Speech to the Institute for Comparative and International Law, Melbourne, 19 March 2003) 2. 
117 Ibid, 3. 
138 Ibid. 
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notions of parliamentary sovereignty. The presence of indigenous peoples within 
countries points to the State as a container of not one but several communities.
139 
Resolving the issue of indigenous self-determination within States has been 
problematic. States have predictably adopted the inflexible and somewhat 
unimaginative stance that their sovereign authority is absolute and indivisible. How 
long this stance will remain is uncertain, but the standoff need not be so categorical. 
Indigenous peoples generally acknowledge the State's authority to govern, while 
reserving to them the right to control their own affairs . 
(i) When is secession authorised? 
There are a limited number of circumstances whereby peoples are entitled to 
secede from the State. These are where: 
140 
A colonial government governs a nation from outside the nation's territory; a people 
is subject to "alien subjugation, domination and exploitation" ; and where "peoples 
separate from their parent state with its acquiescence or because the parent state 
disintegrates". 
International law appears to recognise a remedial right to secede, particularly in 
response to serious injustices, but not a general right of self-determination that 
includes a right to secede. 141 Only indigenous groups who fall within these 
categories, or who qualify for this remedial right, are able to secede.
142 The 
Declaration does not modify this rule, nor do indigenous peoples claim any such 
authorisation under the Declaration. Unless indigenous groups qualify for a right to 
secede, it is clear that a right to self-determination under the Declaration does not 
include secession, and that States' fears of secession, therefore, are unreasonable and 
unwarranted. This is consistent with the argument that secession is not the only 
interpretation of self-determination, and does not exhaust its meaning. If self-
detern1ination only meant secession, it would be expressed as a right to secede.
143 
139 Keal, abo ve n 130, 301. 
14° Chc1 rters, above n 87, 336. 
141 Allen Buchanan Justice, l egitimacy, and Seif-Determination: Moral Foundations for International 
luw (Oxford Uni ve rsity Press, ew York, 2007) 331. 
142 Ibid. 
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4 The content of indigenous self-determination 
The key task for States and indigenous peoples is to settle on what an internal 
right of self-determination means. Indigenous representatives have argued that self-
determination is not a static concept, but that it is continually evolving. They have 
expressed concerns that States have considered the implementation of that right as a 
pre-defined outcome rather than an ongoing process.
144 States have immediately 
assumed that self-determination means secession, whereas indigenous peoples have 
been more pragmatic in its application. 
The parameters for any self-determination arrangement needs to be 
individually determined through a process of dialogue and consultation between 
indigenous communities and the State, based on principles of "justice, democracy, 
respect for human rights, equality, non-discrimination, good governance and good 
faith" . 145 Attempting to define self-determination is a somewhat abstract and 
speculative exercise without knowing the relevant circumstances and conditions of its 
exercise. It is something that will develop as the right is increasingly recognised and 
negotiated within States. 146 Internal self-determination arrangements will likely vary 
between indigenous groups, but they should include the development of power-
sharing models between indigenous peoples and the State, and the empowerment of 
tribal authorities to be able to distribute necessary services, such as welfare and other 
social services to its members. The extent of autonomous control sought by 
indigenous communities will depend on the needs of each group. Smaller, under-
resourced tribes or sub-tribes will likely seek to maintain ongoing relationships with 
larger tribes or with the State, whereas larger, well-resourced indigenous groups will 
1ikely seek greater independence from the State, short of secession. Empowering 
tribal authorities should include the provision of financial resources, enacting national 
or local government legislation, and where necessary, adjusting constitutional 
arrangements to accommodate indigenous needs. 
144 Report of the 1999 sess ion of the Commiss ion Working Group, above n 121 , para 47. 
145 UN Declara tion on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, above n I , Article 46(3). 
146 Stacey Ann Shortall Aboriginal Seif-Government in Aotearoa/New Zealand: A View through the 
Canadian lens (LLM Research Paper, Univers ity of Alberta , 1996) 25. 
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(a) Political, economic, social and cultural self-determination 
The right to self-determination has four key aspects; political, economic, 
social and cultural. In exercising this right, indigenous peoples may freely determine 
their political status, as well as their economic, social and cultural development.
147 
These four aspects are said to be interdependent, and can only be fully realised 
through the recognition and implementation of each.
148 The political right of self-
determination enables indigenous peoples to create their own governing institutions, 
which may take the form of tribally elected councils or forums. The exercise of this 
right will vary from region to region, ranging from autonomous or self-governing 
institutions, quasi-federal relationships with the State, self-management, national 
government representation and full integration with the State. While some indigenous 
groups may contemplate full independence as an expression of their right to political 
self-determination, it is clear that the content of indigenous self-determination under 
the Declaration does not include a right to secede. As discussed above, it will only 
apply under a limited number of circumstances, which falls outside the ambit of the 
Declaration. 
(i) "Constitutive" self-determination 
Determining a people's political status has been described as the "constitutive 
aspect" 149 of self-determination, which Anaya explains as "the creation of processes 
guided by the will of the people governed".
150 This occurs when a group makes a 
fundamental decision about their political status, such as independence, autonomy, 
self-government, self-management, integration and so forth. The important aspect of 
exercising self-determination is the process by which a group is able to determine 
their own political status, instead of that decision being determined for them. 
Allowing for groups to determine their own status is an essential part of the 
constitutive process, and is an expression of the autonomous will of the group. 
14 7 UN Declaration on the Rights oflndigenous Peoples, above n 1, Article 3. 
148 Hector Gros Espie ll Study on the Right to Seif-Determination: Implementation of Un ited Nations 
Resolutions E!CN.4/Sub.2/405/Rev.l (United ations, 1 ew York, 1980) para 11 3. 
149 Anaya, above n 11 , I 04. 
150 Ib id. 
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(ii) "Ongoing" self-determination 
The economic, social and cultural aspects of the right fall under what Anaya 
defines as the "ongoing aspect" of self-determination.
151 After their political status 
has been determined through the constitutive process, the ongoing aspect allows the 
tribal authority to make decisions that reflect the will of its tribal members in the 
economic, social and cultural aspects of their lives. It is important for a self-
governing group to be able to exercise and retain real political authority rather than 
delegated authority, which can be overridden or revoked at a later point.
152 Ongoing 
self-determination will include matters such as the establishment of tribal councils and 
authorities, tribal constitutions, tribal rules and regulations, including membership 
registration and participatory rights. It will also include the development and control 
of tribal assets and resources for the benefit of tribal members, including the 
establishment of corporate governance structures, programmes for education, health, 
other social services, and enforcement agencies and tribunals within tribal 
jurisdictions. Tribal authorities will be able to conduct their affairs according to the 
customs and traditions of the group, which will ensure the cultural development and 
survival of that group. 
Acknowledging and accommodating self-governing groups is not expected to 
have a dramatic impact on the way society currently conducts itself, or on their 
relationship with the State. They will still be required, individually and as a 
collective, to uphold domestic and international law. It may be necessary to establish 
mutually agreeable standards for the provision of social services, such as national 
educational standards for example. It is expected that self-governing peoples will 
maintain their interaction with and contribute to modem society as they are now. 
They will likely continue to live as they are now, but as a collective they will have 
greater control over the economic, social and cultural aspects of their lives, even from 
outside traditional tribal areas. For example, tribal child-welfare agencies may be 
better equipped to address the needs of their own members within existing 
communities rather than centralised governmental agencies. Tribal social welfare 
agencies will be able to provide social development courses in a more culturally 
151 Ibid. 
152 Buchanan, above n 141,333. 
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instructive and receptive manner. Tribes will be able to provide financial assistance 
to its members through training incentives, scholarship programmes and other 
educational schemes. 
Commercial development and success within the tribe is essential for the 
provision of such services. The settlement process for historical grievances will play 
an important role in the allocation of assets and settlement funds to tribal groups, 
which will contribute significantly to economic self-reliance and development. Tribal 
peoples will also be able to maintain and preserve their lands and natural resources 
using proven cultural methods of resource management, rather than relying on 
resource management legislation. All of these practices will contribute significantly 
to the cultural identity, preservation and development of the group. 
5 Seif-determination in practice 
Indigenous peoples have been able to exercise limited forms of self-
determination with the devolution of government services to tribal authorities, which 
have taken a limited form of self-government within state structures. They have also 
benefited financially from the allocation of settlement assets and other resources, 
which have provided opportunities for economic development. The emergence of 
modem tribal authorities has enabled indigenous peoples to be more collective in their 
negotiations with the State, more assertive in their demands and better organised in 
the management of tribal assets, resources and services. Devolution policies have 
provided an avenue for the empowerment and self-management of indigenous groups, 
but they have failed to adequately address the negative effects of colonisation, while 
the state is prepared to allow only those activities that do not present a serious 
challenge to its legitimacy.15
3 True relationships of equality and partnership between 
indigenous peoples and the State will see the development of real and effective 
power-sharing arrangements between indigenous groups and the State, rather than 
indigenous groups and State departments.
154 It would see the real transfer of power 
rather than the allocation of funds and the setting of external expectations. Indigenous 
153 Kea l, above n 130,297. 
154 Alan Ward and Janine Hayward "Tino Rangatira tanga : Maori in the Politica l and Administra tive 
Sys tem" in Paul Haveman (ed) In digenous Peoples' Rights in Australia, Canada and New Zealan d 
(Oxford University Press, Auck land, I 999) 378, 396. 
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peoples seek recognition of their traditional right to exercise their inherent sovereign 
authority over land, people and resources. As noted above, indigenous self-
determination is an inherent right that is not granted, but rather acknowledged. While 
the State can not transfer or grant self-determination, it is something that a colonising 
power can disregard through command and control. For self-determination to be 
effective and operative the State must be prepared to recognise it and allow it to 
operate. For the State this means a relinquishing of their control over aspects of tribal 
life as well as an acknowledgment that some aspects of indigenous life are better 
controlled by indigenous peoples. States should move towards the "effective sharing 
of power and decision-making at all levels". 
155 Services should not simply be 
devolved or hastily transferred to tribal groups. There needs to be adequate planning 
and resources in order to strengthen tribal authorities and develop partnership 
relationships with all levels of government.
156 
Recognising indigenous self-determination should, as a starting point, allow 
for tribal authorities to take greater control of the social, cultural and economic 
development of its members. This will enable tribal authorities to address the various 
challenges that they face according to their own customs. This will include matters 
such as employment, education and development, health care, child-welfare and other 
social services, as well as other areas where the State has so far failed to provide for 
indigenous needs. Tribal settlements will play an important role in providing the 
necessary resources for tribal groups to operate independently. The State, however, 
can greatly assist in this process by acknowledging the authority of traditional tribal 
structures over its members, affirming indigenous customs and ideologies, and by 
ensuring that tribal authorities are adequately resourced. This process will empower 
indigenous groups and provide opportunities for tribal authorities to take greater 
control of their own destinies. It will allow indigenous peoples to make a greater 
contribution to themselves and to the country. 
157 The strengthening of tribal 
authorities will help to establish a system of legal and political structures that are 
representative of tribal members and capable of administering social and economic 
155 Royal Commiss ion on Social Policy The April Report, Vo lume II: Future Directions (Royal 
Commiss ion on Social Policy, Wellington, 1988) 79. 
156 Iorns Maga llanes , above n 98, 163. 
157 Maui Solomon "The Context for Maori" in Alison Quentin-Baxter (ed) Recognising the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples (Victoria University of Wellington, Wellington, 1998) 60, 84. 
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programmes for the development of its members. Tribal authorities will also carry the 
necessary legal and political mandate of its members, enabling it to represent the will 
and needs of its people in negotiations with the State. This is an important building 
process in that it will help to identify and re-establish partnerships between 
indigenous peoples and the State. 
More importantly, it should be seen that recogmsmg indigenous self-
determination need not come at the expense of State sovereignty, territorial integrity 
or political unity. Multiple or overlapping sovereignties should not be seen as a 
diminishing of State powers, especially in contemporary and increasingly global 
times. Paul Keal identifies a diffusion of state sovereignty so that increasingly full 
state sovereignty can only be exercised through the cooperation of different 
institutions and groups. 158 Societies need to be sufficiently flexible to accommodate 
the needs of the various groups within its borders, particularly indigenous groups. For 
States with indigenous populations, this could mean a re-assessment of governmental 
functions and responsibilities, and where necessary a re-allocation of powers and 
authority to ensure that tribal authorities are able to freely exercise authority over 
tribal matters without unwanted outside interference. 
6 Evidence of international customary law 
Tribal autonomy and self-government arrangements, as manifestations of self-
determination, are already widely recognised within the CANZUS States. In the US, 
the Indian Self-Determination Act 1975 provides an early example of the policy to 
strengthen tribal entities through the devolution of federal services and the 
establishment of federal-tribal relations. The US Supreme Court in Santa Clara 
Pueblo v Martinez also upheld the importance of protecting tribal self-government, 
particularly in relation to tribal membership and the role of tribal courts.
159 Tribal 
self-government was also affirmed by the US in explanation of their vote against the 
Declaration, which said that under domestic Jaw: 
160 
158 Kea l, above n 130, 302 . 
159 San ta Clara Pueblo v Ma rtinez 436 US 49 (1 978), 72 . 
160 UNGA Plenary Meeting ( 13 September 2007), above n 3. 
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The Government recognised Indian tribes as political entities with inherent powers of 
self-government as first peoples. In its legal system, the federal Government had a 
government-to-government relationship with Indian tribes. In that domestic context, 
that meant promoting tribal self-government over a broad range of internal and local 
affairs, including determination of membership, culture, language, religion, education, 
information, social welfare, economic activities, and land and resources management. 
In response to the Canadian Supreme Court decision in Calder v British Columbia, 161 
the Canadian federal government accepted the principle of aboriginal self-
determination, which recognised the existence of aboriginal title at common law. 
This was affirmed under section 35 of the Constitution Act 1982, which upheld tribal 
self-government via the recognition of existing aboriginal and treaty rights of the 
aboriginal peoples. In recognition of this right, Canada also helped to draft the self-
determination provisions throughout the drafting process of the Declaration. 
Common Jaw aboriginal title was also recognised by the Australian High 
Court decision in Mabo v Queensland, 162 which rejected the terra nullius fiction. The 
court also identified that recognising aboriginal title brought Australia into line with 
their international obligations, in particular the right of non-discrimination under the 
Optional Protocol to the ICCPR. 163 Mechanisms recognising aboriginal control over 
lands and tribal affairs included the Aboriginal Council and Associations Act 1976, 
the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders Commission Act 1989 and the Native Title 
Act 1993. There is a close connection between the recognition of land rights and the 
realisation of self-determination. The recognition of aboriginal title provides the basis 
for indigenous groups to exercise tribal authority or self-determination over a defined 
area and to control their own affairs. The recognition of aboriginal title is therefore an 
essential step towards the self-determination of indigenous peoples, 
In New Zealand, self-government arrangements were first provided under 
section 71 of the New Zealand Constitution Act 1852, which provided for the "native 
inhabitants" to govern themselves according to their own "laws, customs and usages". 
More recently, the government has provided for the establishment of Maori 
161 Calder v British Columbia (A ttorney General) [ 1973] SCR 313 . 
162 Mabo v Queensland ( 1992) I 07 ALR I , 28 (HCA). 
163 Ibid , para 42. 
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councils, 164 tribal riinanga, 165 and Treaty settlements,
166 while the strengthening of 
tribal autonomy has been proposed under a new system of tribal governance entities 
by the Law Commission. 167 
It is arguable whether these self-government mechanisms have actually 
assisted indigenous development, but their purpose of strengthening tribal autonomy 
and internal indigenous self-determination is clear. It is argued, therefore, that State 
provisions for indigenous self-determination across the CANZUS States, albeit to 
varying degrees, provides evidence of State practice and opinio juris in relation to 
indigenous self-determination. This arguably provides strong evidence of emerging, 
if not existing, international customary law on indigenous self-determination. 
B Lands, Territories and Resources 
The second key provision that the CANZUS States had difficulty with was in 
relation to land, territory and resource rights. The Declaration makes a number of 
references to land rights, reflecting comments made by UN treaty bodies on prevailing 
discrimination on indigenous land rights. 
168 The issue of land rights is central to the 
question of survival of indigenous peoples and their cultures. As Warren Allmand 
identifies: 169 
The indigenous concept of land as collective property was alien to the new settlers in 
much of the world; their relationship to the land was deeply spiritual and the 
destruction of that link was often equally damaging to their identity. 
Consequently, the provisions on lands, territories and resources are critical to 
any international instrument dealing with the rights of indigenous peoples, 
164 Maori Conmmnity Development Act 1962. 
165 Iwi Runanga Act 1990. 
166 See for example, the Maori Fisheries Act 2004, which provides the allocation model for the 
distribution of fisheries settlement assets under the Maori Fisheries Act 1989 and the Treaty of 
Waitangi (Fisheries Claims) Settlement Act I 992. The 2004 Act establishes a number of requirements 
before assets can be distributed to tribal groups, including the mandating of iwi (tribal) organisations; 
see, Maori Fisheries Act 2004, ss 13-14. 
167 Law Commission Waka Umanga: A Proposed law for Maori Governance Entities (NZLC R92, 
Wellington, 2006). 
168 Xanthaki, above n 6, 117. 
169 Allmand, above n 8, 38. 
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highlighting the importance of these rights for indigenous peoples, and the connection 
between land rights and the enjoyment of other indigenous rights. 
Article 26(1) of the Declaration provides that indigenous peoples have the 
right to the lands, territories and resources that they have traditionally owned, 
occupied or otherwise used or acquired. Article 26(2) provides that indigenous 
peoples have the right to own, use, develop and control the lands, territories and 
resources that they possess by reason of traditional ownership or other traditional 
occupation or use, as well as those that they have otherwise acquired. Article 26(3) 
provides that States shall give legal recognition and protection to these lands, 
territories and resources. Such recognition shall be conducted with due respect for the 
customs, traditions and land tenure systems of the indigenous peoples concerned. 
The main concern of the opposing States is the impact that indigenous land 
rights might have on lands now lawfully owned and occupied by other citizens, both 
indigenous and non-indigenous. Australia pointed out that the land and resource 
provisions could be read to require recognition of indigenous rights to lands without 
regard to other legal rights existing in land. Canada found the provisions to be overly 
broad, unclear and capable of a wide variety of interpretations, discounting the need to 
recognise a range of rights over land and possibly putting into question matters that 
had been settled by treaty. New Zealand asserted that the provision on lands and 
resources could not be implemented in New Zealand. They argued that in terms of 
ownership and control the lands, territories and resources provisions could be read to 
"require recognition of rights to lands now lawfully owned by other citizens". They 
continued that if New Zealand were to recognise indigenous people's rights to own, 
use, develop or control lands and territories that they had traditionally owned, 
occupied or used, the entire country could potentially be caught within the scope of 
this provision, which appeared to require recognition of rights to lands now lawfully 
owned by other citizens. 
Once again, the CANZUS objections appear to be exaggerated. It is submitted 
that the lands, territories and resources provisions under the Declaration do not 
support the concerns of the CANZUS States. 
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1 Article 26(1) 
Article 26(1) provides that "indigenous peoples have the right to the lands, 
territories and resources which they have traditionally owned, occupied or otherwise 
used or acquired". This provision establishes as a starting point the rights that 
indigenous peoples have to the lands, territories and resources that they traditionally 
owned according to their customary land tenure systems. It recognises the validity of 
these customary land tenure systems and the failure of colonial legal systems to 
recognise indigenous customary or treaty rights to lands. As a result, indigenous 
peoples were often unlawfully dispossessed of their lands, territories and resources. 
Article 26( 1) establishes that indigenous peoples have legitimate claims to these 
lands, and that States should acknowledge the validity of customary ownership of 
traditional indigenous lands and, where possible, facilitate the return of unlawfully 
confiscated lands, territories and resources to indigenous communities. 
States will rightly be concerned at the impact that land rights under Article 
26(1) could potentially have on lands now lawfully owned by other citizens. Article 
26( 1 ), however, must be read in the context of Article 28, which provides for the 
redress of traditionally owned and occupied lands and territories that have been 
confiscated, taken or used without the free, prior and informed consent of the 
indigenous group. Redress can include restitution, but when this is not possible States 
should provide just, fair and equitable compensation. Indigenous peoples may have 
rights to traditionally held lands, but pragmatism recognises that the return of 
confiscated lands to indigenous peoples may not always be possible. 
Article 26(1) must also be read in the context of Article 46(2), which provides 
for the "due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and for 
meeting the just and most compelling requirements of a democratic society." This 
will clearly cover the property rights of other citizens, which means that the rights of 
indigenous communities to traditionally held lands must be balanced against the 
existing rights of others, and the need to maintain societal order. 
As with most rights under the Declaration, the land, territory and resource 
rights are not absolute, nor are they binding. They are to be negotiated and reconciled 
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between indigenous peoples and the State in a spirit of partnership and mutual respect 
in order to reach the best possible outcome. This may include the return of 
indigenous lands or compensation for confiscated lands, but it should not be taken as 
only meaning the restitution of lands. 
2 Article 26(2) 
Article 26(2) on the other hand elaborates on the property rights that 
indigenous peoples have over the traditional lands, territories and resources that they 
l 
170 current y possess. Under Article 26(2) indigenous peoples are entitled to "own, 
use, develop and control" the lands, territories and resources that they possess by 
reason of their traditional ownership or occupation. It holds that indigenous peoples 
have the same property rights to own, use, develop or control lands that they currently 
possess according to their traditional customs as other citizens have to own, use, 
develop or control their lands. It does not provide rights of ownership, development 
or control over the traditional lands, territories and resources that indigenous groups 
no longer possess and it provides no additional property rights to traditional lands they 
possess that other citizens do not already enjoy. 
In relation to traditionally owned, occupied and used lands that are not 
currently possessed by indigenous peoples (often as a result of injustice), indigenous 
peoples only have the explicit right under Article 25 to maintain and strengthen their 
"distinctive spiritual relationship". 171 This provision appears to make allowance for 
custodial or guardianship-type arrangements over traditional lands, territories or 
resources, which will allow indigenous communities to manage resources consistent 
with their own customs and "to uphold their responsibilities to future generations", 
172 
while also guaranteeing public use or access to that land, territory or resource. This 
provision does not allow for indigenous property rights of ownership, development or 
exclusive control. 
1
"
0 UN Declara tion on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, above n I, Article 26(2) ( emphas is added). 
171 Ib id, Artic le 25. See also, Charters, above n 87, 337 . 
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46 
The existing rights of other citizens to lands are therefore not threatened under 
these provisions as the CANZUS States assert. 
3 Summary 
The content of Article 26(1) and Article 26(2) demonstrates a differentiation 
of rights between the provisions. There is an important distinction between the 
Article 26(1) rights of indigenous peoples to their traditionally held lands, which they 
clearly no longer posses, and the use-rights under Article 26(2) to lands they currently 
possess. Indigenous peoples may argue for the return of confiscated lands under 
Article 26( 1 ), but these rights are to be balanced against Articles 28 and 46(2). 
Article 26( 1) rights are not absolute, but are to be balanced against the existing rights 
of other citizens and the exigencies of the State to govern for the good of all of its 
citizens and the maintenance of societal order. Article 26(1) may, in effect, be limited 
to moral or aspirational rights with little prospect for realisation, but they should not 
be trivialised or disregarded. 
Article 26(2) on the other hand establishes indigenous property rights to lands 
they currently possess; rights that are no different to the property rights of other 
citizens. 
The lands, territory and resource prov1s10ns, therefore, do not recogmse 
indigenous rights to lands to the extent that the CANZUS States claim. To argue that 
the land, territories and resource provisions will impact on the existing land rights of 
other citizens is therefore exaggerated because the Declaration does not guarantee to 
indigenous peoples what the CANZUS States claims that it does. It does not give 
priority to indigenous peoples land rights over the existing land rights of others and it 
does not create additional rights for indigenous peoples that other citizens do not 
already enjoy. Providing redress for confiscated lands under Article 28 strengthens 
the argument that Article 26 only provides rights to lands, territories and resources 
that indigenous communities currently possess, because it clearly accommodates for 
lands and resources that are no longer in indigenous peoples' ownership. 173 In fact, 
173 Charters, above n 87, 337. 
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Article 26 protects the interests of the State and its citizens while upholding the rights 
of indigenous peoples, by balancing indigenous land rights against the need to 
recognise and respect the rights and freedoms of others and the preservation of 
democratic society. Moreover, Article 26 seems to be more focussed on the 
recognition of customary indigenous land tenure systems rather than exclusive 
property rights to land. Whether the lands in question were, are, or will be possessed 
by indigenous communities, the emphasis of Article 26 seems to be on the recognition 
of traditional methods of land ownership, which take account of the collective nature 
of land rights in indigenous societies. 
4 Evidence of international customary law 
The recognition of aboriginal title across the CANZUS States is firmly 
established, 174 as well as the recognition of treaty rights and redress over traditional 
lands. Settlement packages have included the return of lands as well as compensation. 
In addition, Article 25 custodial arrangements over lands, short of full property rights, 
which allow for the indigenous management and spiritual connection of traditional 
lands, have also been recognised. 175 The existing recognition of aboriginal title within 
each of the CANZUS States is firmly grounded in applicable legislation, common 
law, constitutions and treaty agreements. State practice and opinio juris in relation to 
the lands, territories and resources provisions under the Declaration provide the 
strongest evidence of international customary law in relation to indigenous land 
rights. 
174 See also, Delgamuukw v British Columbia [ I 997] 3 SCR IOI O (Canada); The Wik Peoples v The 
Swte of Queensland ( I 996) I 34 ALR 637 (HCA) (Australia); Ngati Apa v Attorney-General [2003] 3 
NZLR 643 (CA) para 87 per Elias CJ (New Zealand); Cherokee Nation v Georgia, 5 Pet. I (183 l) ; 
Worcester v State of Georgia, 6 Pet. 515 ( 1832); Mitchel v United States, 9 Pet. 711 (I 835) (United 
States). 
175 See for example, Part 2 of the Foreshore and Seabed act 2004, which provides for territorial 
cus tomary orders or the establishment of reserves over the foreshore and seabed. See also, Crown 
negotiations with Ngati Porou and Te Whanau-a-Apanui over the foreshore and seabed. The outcome 
of these negotiations could range from guardianship rights over the foreshore and seabed through to 
rights of veto over resource consent and management activities for these tribal groups; see for example, 
Hon Dr Michael Cullen "Foreshore and seabed Heads of Agreement with Ngati Porou" (5 Febrnary 
2008) www.beehive.govt.nz/release (accessed 27 February 2008). 
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C Free, Prior and Informed Consent 
Under Article 19 of the Declaration, States are required to consult and 
cooperate in good faith with indigenous peoples in order to obtain their free, prior and 
informed consent in relation to legislative or administrative measures that may affect 
them, while Article 32 requires consultation and cooperation in good faith on any 
projects affecting indigenous people's lands, territories or resources. The rationale for 
these provisions is that consultation and cooperation, based on the principles of 
equality, non-discrimination, protection, self-determination, autonomy, partnership 
and mutual respect, will enhance the harmonious relations between indigenous 
peoples and the State. 176 
In opposition to these provisions, the CANZUS States were concerned that 
this would imply a right of veto over democratic and legislative action, and would 
apply a standard for indigenous peoples that did not apply to others in the population. 
It was argued that indigenous peoples would have a right of veto that other groups or 
individuals did not have. 
The CANZUS States' concerns are once agam exaggerated. Article 19 is 
limited to matters that "may affect" indigenous peoples, and in order to obtain 
"consent", rather than a right of veto. This right is consistent with States recognising 
indigenous groups as distinct peoples with certain rights, and not as minorities. It is 
hoped that such recognition would encourage and promote consultation and 
cooperation in good faith, and in a spirit of partnership. Its coverage is therefore not 
as universal as the CANZUS states infer. 
States were also concerned that consent rights for indigenous peoples that 
would create different classes of citizenship are discriminatory and would amount to 
apartheid. This is also exaggerated. The international law instruments that forbid 
racial discrimination look at the consequences of the different treatment of particular 
groups, not the mere fact that groups are treated differently.
177 
Apartheid had the 
effect of denying fundamental human rights and freedoms, including political rights, 
176 UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, above n 1, Preamble. 
177 Quentin-Baxter, above n 120, 29. 
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to sections of a national community. Because apartheid had that kind of exclusionary 
effect, it involved racial discrimination. The Declaration prescribes different 
treatment for indigenous peoples with the object of enhancing, rather than impairing 
their political and other rights. In doing so it does not nullify or impair the enjoyment 
or exercise of human rights and fundamental freedoms of non-indigenous peoples.
178 
Self-determination should not be equated with apartheid. 
179 
If the exercise of indigenous self-determination and rights over land, territories 
and resources is to be meaningful and respected, indigenous peoples must have real 
control over matters that may affect them. This means consulting and cooperating 
with indigenous groups in good faith in order to obtain their free, prior and informed 
consent and for effective tribal governance. Unfortunately, some States do not have a 
good record in this area. In doing so, States miss out on opportunities to develop 
partnerships, improve relations and build trust. 
1 Evidence of international customary law 
In its dealings with indigenous peoples, New Zealand claims to have some of 
the most extensive consultation mechanisms in the world. 
18° Consultation is 
recognised as an important principle of the Treaty of Waitangi, 
181 particularly where 
legislation would affect Maori rights and interests under the Treaty. 182 The 
government has also directed that "departments should consult with appropriate Maori 
178 Ibid. 
179 David Williams "Self-Determination is Not Apartheid" (I November 2007) www.herald.co.nz 
(accessed 1 December 2007). 
180 UNGA Plenary meeting (13 September 2007), above n 3. 
1
~ 
1 See for example, New Zealand Maori Council v Attorney-General [ 1987) ZLR 641, 683 per 
Richardson J 
182 See for example, Royal Commission on Social Policy The April Report, Volume II: Future 
Directions (Royal Commission on Social Policy, Wellington, 1988) at 73, which sets out the following 
guidelines for consultation: It will be necessary to identify at an early stage the Treaty issues involved, 
that is, the significant matters "affecting the application of the Treaty" and Maori rights and interests, 
that will be the subject of the proposed legislation a11d necessitate <;:onsultation; Consultation must be 
with appropriate Maori people or institutions including representatives from any iwi or hapi:i 
particularly affected; Consultation may in the first instance have to extend to identifying the Treaty 
issues and rights and interests involved and to the matters raised in Part 2 and Part 3 below; 
Consultation should as far as possible be in a form that those consulted regard as appropriate and 
should have clear results that are communicated by way of feedback to them and their communities. 
50 
people on significant matters affecting the application of the Treaty" .183 This provides 
evidence that within New Zealand, consultation is regarded as important. 
Consultation does not necessarily mean veto rights, but if the State is serious 
about indigenous rights it will accept that indigenous groups may exercise that option. 
More recently, the New Zealand government has commenced negotiations with tribal 
groups from the East Coast region of the North Island over customary rights in the 
foreshore and seabed. 184 Where territorial customary rights are recognised over the 
foreshore and seabed, tribal groups will be granted "permission rights", which will 
give them the right to approve or withhold approval for any resource consent 
applications over that area.185 It provides evidence of opinio juris and State practice 
in relation indigenous consultation and consent rights. Their opposition to Article 19 
is puzzling given their acceptance of indigenous consultation and consent rights 
domestically. Moreover, it indicates that consultation between indigenous peoples 
and the State can work, that tribal input and control are essential to the exercise of 
their rights, and that a veto right is not necessarily something to be feared. 
183 Ibid , 72. 
184 Hon Dr Michae l Cullen "Foreshore and seabed Heads of Agreement with Ngati Porou" (5 Febrnary 
2008) www.beehive .govt.nz/release (accessed 27 Febrnary 2008). 
185 Ibid. 
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VI MAKING THE DECLARATION WORK 
A The Legal Effect oftlte Declaration 
It was the clear intention of the States involved with the drafting of the 
Declaration that it be regarded as an aspirational document with political and moral, 
rather than legal force, 
186 and as a "standard of achievement to be pursued in a spirit 
of partnership and mutual respect".
187 From a formal standpoint, the Declaration is 
not legally binding on States. If it were intended to be legally binding, it would have 
been couched in an appropriately worded instrument. As it was, it still took nearly 25 
years for States and indigenous representatives to develop a non-binding, aspirational 
document. Compare this with the passage of the Convention on the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities and its Optional Protocol, the only other human rights instrument to 
be negotiated thus far in the 21 
st century. This Convention was negotiated during 
eight sessions of an Ad Hoe Committee of the GA from 2002 to 2006, making it the 
fastest negotiated human rights treaty.
188 It was signed by 81 States on 30 March 
2007, the highest number of signatures of any human rights convention on its opening 
day. 189 Although the Declaration contains equally fundamental human rights 
guarantees, its potentially far-reaching implications make it a highly contested 
document. 
The process for reconciling indigenous interests will be similar for most 
countries, whether governments voted in favour of the Declaration or not. Providing 
for indigenous interests will likely require concessions from both indigenous peoples 
and the State. States and indigenous groups will need to develop mechanisms that 
will accommodate processes of dialogue, negotiations and cooperation in good faith. 
Indigenous groups will be able to draw on the principles of the Declaration, which 
represent international consensus on indigenous peoples' rights, in order to exert 
moral pressure on their governments, even if they are channelled through international 
186 U GA Plenary Meeting (13 September 2007), above n 3. 
187 lJ01 Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, above n I, Preamble. 
188 UNGA "Status of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and the Optional 
Protocol thereto" ( 14 August 2007) A/62/230. 
189 Ibid . 
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forums to effect domestic change.
190 Even prior to its adoption, the persuasiveness of 
the Declaration was demonstrated in New Zealand within the court system, 
191 and in 
negotiations on Treaty settlements and Waitangi Tribunal Claims.
192 
In terms of giving effect to the Declaration, Bolivia has taken the lead by 
incorporating the Declaration into domestic legislation under National Law 3760 
shortly after it was adopted by the GA. This legislation is an exact copy of the 
Declaration. In incorporating the Declaration into domestic law the Bolivian 
President asserted that adopting the Declaration is not about indigenous peoples 
taking vengeance on anything, but about having their rights respected. 
193 While the 
world's States may have different priorities for the application of the Declaration 
domestically, States can still give effect to the Declaration in ways that suit their own 
circumstances. 
1 A relational approach 
The Declaration recogmses that the situation of indigenous peoples vanes 
from region to region and from country to country, which would require the history, 
background and particularities of each situation to be taken into consideration. 
194 For 
this reason it was intended for each State to develop their own unique mechanisms to 
address the particular rights and concerns of its indigenous populations, not in a 
formalistic or legalistic way, but in a spirit of partnership and mutual respect. By not 
supporting the Declaration, the CANZUS States have turned down the opportunity to 
declare to the rest of the world their intentions of better recognising the rights of its 
indigenous peoples by adopting the Declaration, notwithstanding any objections they 
may have had with specific provisions within the Declaration. They could have 
invoked the persistent objector doctrine on contested provisions, while supporting the 
overall purpose of the Declaration. It is arguable, however, whether States can invoke 
the persistent objector doctrine where there is evidence of State practice, opinio juris 
or international customary law. 
190 Ioms Magallanes, above n 10, 265 . 
191 Ngai Ta hu Maori Trust Board v Director-General 0JC011servation [1995] 3 NZLR 553 (CA). 
192 Charters, above n 13, 34 . 
193 Rick Keams "UN Declara tion Becomes Law of the Land in Bolivia" (I O December 2007) 
www. ind iancountry.com/content/ (accessed 19 January 2008). 
194 UN Dec laration on the Rights of Indige nous Peoples, Preamble. 
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By not supporting the Declaration, the CANZUS States have demonstrated to 
the world that they are unwilling to move forward with international developments, 
but are willing to maintain the status quo. In this regard, they also miss the point that 
in both international and domestic law, negotiating in good faith, in an endeavour to 
reach agreement, is accepted as the best, and indeed only way of reconciling 
competing rights and resolving conflicting interests that are characteristic of a 
complex modem society. 195 Quentin-Baxter adds that "negotiations to give effect to 
the rights set out in the Declaration would not be at large. Both parties would have 
the protection of negotiating within the framework of mutually accepted, overarching 
principles." 196 
Opportunities are also missed for relationship building. As Matthew Palmer 
identifies, the process of settling indigenous claims illustrates the futility of focussing 
primarily on legal rights, instead of taking a broader approach that acknowledges the 
cultural nature of the relationship. 197 A relational approach to interactions between 
the State and indigenous groups recognises that governments and indigenous groups 
are in an ongoing relationship managed through mechanisms satisfactory to both, with 
an emphasis on dialogue, negotiation and cooperation.
198 It was never intended for 
the Declaration to provide or stipulate the framework for this to happen. The onus is 
on States and indigenous peoples to establish a suitable framework, using the 
internationally accepted standards of the Declaration to guide the discussion. The 
focus should be one of reconciliation, relationship-building and finding better ways to 
accommodate 'difference' within that relationship, rather than competing visions of 
who should have the last word. 199 In dealing with calls to devolve or transfer 
important aspects of national sovereignty, Paul Kennedy identifies that:
200 
The key autonomous actor in political and international affairs for the past few 
centuries appears not just to be losing its control and integrity, but to be the wrong sort 
of unit to handle the newer circumstances. For some problems, it is too large to 
operate effectively; for others, it is too small. In consequence, there are pressures for a 
19 5 Quentin-Baxter, above n 120, 31. 
196 Ibid. 
197 Palmer, above n 93, 93. 
198 Ibid, 89. 
199 Rt Hon Dame Sian Elias, above n 136, 4 . 
200 Paul Kennedy Preparing for the twenty-first century (Random House, New York, 1993) 131 
( emphasis added). 
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"relocation of authority" both upward and downward, creating structures that might 
respond better to today's and tomorrow's forces for change. 
Some of those "newer circumstances" include the need to improve the 
economic, social and cultural conditions of indigenous communities, as well as better 
recognise the place of indigenous peoples within constitutions. Indigenous peoples 
insist on having more control over their own affairs in order to truly realise their 
political, economic, social and cultural development. International standards for 
indigenous autonomy have been affirmed under the Declaration. It is incumbent on 
States to respond to contemporary international norms and to work out with its 
indigenous communities how this should unfold, rather than remain "frozen in the 
international law of 200 years ago 11 • 201 
2 The Declaration and the CANZUS States 
Since voting against the Declaration in September 2007, Australia has had a 
change in elected government that has demonstrated an attitude and approach towards 
its indigenous aboriginal peoples that is far more consistent with contemporary views, 
compared with the previous government. The first motion for the incoming 
government at the 42nd Parliament was the issuing of a formal apology for policies 
and legislation that saw the forced removal of aboriginal children from their 
communities between 1910 and 1970. 202 This was a hugely significant step in the 
reconciliation of historical injustices against indigenous peoples in Australia, 
especially with the previous government's unwillingness to address the situation of its 
indigenous peoples by issuing a formal apology. 
The significance of a formal apology was identified in the 1997 Bringing them 
home report, which recommended that the government make reparations to the 
indigenous peoples affected by their forced removal. 203 Reparations included an 
20 1 Anaya, above n 4, 271. 
202 
( 13 February 2008) House of Representatives, I www.aph .gov.au/hansard (accessed 15 February 
2008) . 
203 National Inquiry into the Separation of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Children from their 
Families Bringing them home: Report of th e National lnquily into th e Separation of Aboriginal and 
Torres Srrait Islander Children from th eir Families (Human Rights and Equal Opportunity 
Commiss ion, Sydney, 1997). 
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acknowledgement of responsibility, the issuing of a formal apology, guarantees 
against repetition and monetary compensation.204 One of the key objectives of the 
Declaration is the recognition of historic injustices that resulted from colonisation, 
and taking appropriate steps of redress. 205 In particular, the Declaration condemns 
any act of violence or genocide against indigenous peoples, including the forced 
removal of children of one group to another group.206 In this regard, the current 
Australian government is responding to the needs of its indigenous peoples by 
addressing historic injustices committed against its indigenous communities. In doing 
so, Australia has opted to step out from the shadow of the CANZUS alliance, 
recognising instead the importance of moving forward in a spirit of partnership, 
mutual respect and conciliation with its indigenous peoples, and is upholding 
contemporary international consensus on indigenous issues. 
With the willingness of the Australian government to apologise for its past 
treatment of its indigenous peoples, and take positive steps to address indigenous 
issues, it is worthwhile considering whether Australia would have voted in support of 
the Declaration under the new government? Building on their historic formal 
apology, recent statements from the Australian Foreign Minister confirm that not only 
is the government "positively disposed to the Declaration", but that they are actually 
in the process of reversing their earlier decision on the Declaration.207 This 
demonstrates the positive influence that a change of government can have, and is a 
significant statement to the other CANZUS States that adopting the Declaration is part 
of their future for advancing the interests of indigenous peoples. 
Will Australia's support of the Declaration influence Canada, New Zealand or 
the US to change their stance towards the Declaration? While it is difficult to 
speculate, it is this writer's assertion that although Canada, New Zealand and the US 
may still remain opposed to the Declaration it will be less tenable for these countries 
to maintain their position without the support of the Australian government, especially 
when Australia formally adopts the Declaration. This step will provide additional 
204 fbid , pp 282, 287 and 292. 
105 UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, above n 1, Preamble. 
206 UN Dec lara tion on the Rights of Ind igenous Peoples, above n 1, Article 7(2) . 
207 The Hon Stephen Smith MP "Interview on Meet The Press" ( 17 February 2008) 
www.foreignmi nister.gov.au/ transcripts/ (accessed 19 February 2008). 
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strength to the body of internationally accepted norms on indigenous rights, and will 
weaken the opposition of the remaining CANZUS States to the Declaration. These 
countries will be very concerned about damage to their international reputation, 
especially after Australia's defection in support of the Declaration has left them 
somewhat exposed. Indigenous groups within Canada, New Zealand and the US will 
also be looking to the Australian situation, and will likely pressure their governments 
to follow Australia's lead by also adopting the Declaration. 
In terms of formalising their position, because the Declaration is not a formal 
treaty per se, it will be a matter for the Australian government to simply communicate 
their support in favour of the Declaration. As the Australian Foreign Minister points 
out, once they have concluded their consultation process with stakeholders - the 
Australian States and Territories - they simply let their view be known at the 
appropriate time. 208 This will be yet another significant step towards the international 
recognition of indigenous rights. 
Australia's new attitude towards indigenous issues and particularly the 
Declaration provides an interesting example of the influence that a change of 
government can have on indigenous policies, with other nations already looking to 
Australia's lead to adopt the Declaration. Canada's vote against the Declaration also 
provides an example of the influence that a change of government had on their 
position on the Declaration, only in reverse. Canada previously had a strong record of 
supporting indigenous people's rights both domestically and internationally, and was a 
staunch proponent of the Declaration until the election of a new government in 
Febrnary 2006 .209 Canada went on to strongly oppose the Declaration, which 
included a media campaign against the Declaration, lobbying other States to oppose 
the Declaration and seeking amendments to provisions it had previously helped to 
draft. 210 Their subsequent opposition to the Declaration surprised many, including all 
opposition parties in Canada, who have urged the federal government to change its 
position and support the Declaration.2' 1 
208 Ibid . 
209 Anaya and Wiessner, above n 96. 
21° CNW Group "Lega l experts question Ca nada's arguments aga inst the UN Dec laration" ( 20 
February 2008) www.newswire.ca/en/re leases/ (accessed 25 February 2008). 
21 1 Ibid. 
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Australia has already signalled its intention to adopt the Declaration. Where to 
then for the indigenous peoples of the remaining CANZUS States, whose 
governments voted against a non-binding Declaration? While it is disappointing that 
these States, each with significant issues concerning their indigenous populations, 
could not support an international indigenous rights instrument, each of these 
countries has nevertheless signalled their continued support for indigenous issues at a 
domestic level. By voting against the Declaration, States have perhaps signalled their 
intention to guard against the elaboration or codification of indigenous rights. The 
process of the evolution of rights, from non-binding principles to codified rights, can 
be seen with the development of the human rights instruments. The UN Charter 
affirmed the principles of fundamental human rights and freedoms of the human 
person following the 2nd World War, including equality, non-discrimination and self-
determination. These principles were further elaborated in the Universal Declaration 
and later codified as rights in the 1966 International Covenants, and other legally 
binding instruments protecting against, inter alia, racial discrimination, genocide and 
torture. The governments that opposed the Declaration will want to guard against the 
passage of indigenous peoples' rights eventually being codified into legally binding 
instruments. Indigenous groups need to ensure, however, that the rights discourse 
reflects the interests and perspectives of indigenous peoples. Indigenous peoples will 
also be able to argue for the application of international customary law. By 
participating in the process of the Declaration, the opposing States have demonstrated 
an opinio juris, a willingness to be bound if the provisions as finally formulated were 
in line with their policy preferences.212 As Anaya and Wiessner assert, the internal 
practice of the opposing States, as well as their consent to accord a special status and 
rights to indigenous peoples in principle, makes them part of the world consensus on 
. . l I 213 mtemat1ona customary aw. 
212 Anaya and Wiessner, above n 96. 
213 [bid. 
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VII CONCLUSION 
Will Kymlicka has asserted that "indigenous peoples may get moral victories 
from international law, but the real power remains vested in the hands of sovereign 
States, who can and do ignore international norms" .214 The experience with the 
CANZUS opposition to the Declaration confirms this. While the majority of States 
supported the rights of indigenous peoples, a minority of States can and do ignore 
evolving international norms on indigenous rights. By letting the opposing States set 
the discourse on the application of the Declaration, its value and influence is therefore 
diminished. This paper has argued that the CANZUS objections to the Declaration 
are exaggerated, unreasonable and dated. It has also argued that closer analysis of the 
key provisions has demonstrated that their concerns over the Declaration are 
unfounded. Voting in support of the Declaration presented an opportunity for States 
like New Zealand to take the lead on indigenous issues internationally, and to 
demonstrate that commitment at home. It is unfortunate that the CANZUS States, 
perhaps now with the exception of Australia, have opted to remain frozen in the 
international law of earlier years. 
In terms of the future for the Declaration, it is hoped that recognition of 
indigenous rights will continue to evolve and be accepted domestically and 
internationally. This may occur either through the development of State practice, as 
evidence of international customary law, through international pressure on States to 
recognise internationally accepted standards or when States decide to accept the rights 
of indigenous peoples within their borders, as has been demonstrated recently in 
Australia. For the future development of indigenous rights it is essential that the 
Declaration be seen and developed from indigenous perspectives, with the assistance 
of key states, to ensure that the fundamental nature and integrity of indigenous rights 
are upheld and protected. 
~
14 Will Kymlicka "Theori sing Indigenous Rights" ( I 999) 49 University of Toronto Law Journal 28 I , 
293. 
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IX APPENDIX 1 
United Nations A/61/L.67 
General Assembly 
12 September 2007 
United Nations Declaration on the Rights oflndigenous Peoples 
The General Assembly, 
Taking note of the recommendation of the Human Rights Council contained in its 
resolution 1/2 of 29 June 2006, by which the Council adopted the text of the United 
Nations Declaration on the Rights oflndigenous Peoples, 
Recalling its resolution 61/178 of 20 December 2006, by which it decided to defer 
consideration of and action on the Declaration to allow time for further consultations 
thereon, and also decided to conclude its consideration before the end of the sixty-first 
session of the General Assembly, 
Adopts the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples as 
contained in the annex to the present resolution. 
Annex 
United Nations Declaration on the Rights oflndigenous Peoples 
The General Assembly, 
Guided by the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and good 
faith in the fulfilment of the obligations assumed by States in accordance with the 
Charter, 
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Affirming that indigenous peoples are equal to all other peoples, while recognizing the 
right of all peoples to be different, to consider themselves different, and to be 
respected as such, 
Affirming also that all peoples contribute to the diversity and richness of civilizations 
and cultures, which constitute the common heritage of humankind, 
Affirming further that all doctrines, policies and practices based on or advocating 
superiority of peoples or individuals on the basis of national origin or racial, religious, 
ethnic or cultural differences are racist, scientifically false, legally invalid, morally 
condemnable and socially unjust, 
Reaffirming that indigenous peoples, in the exercise of their rights, should be free 
from discrimination of any kind, 
Concerned that indigenous peoples have suffered from historic injustices as a result 
of, inter alia, their colonization and dispossession of their lands, territories and 
resources, thus preventing them from exercising, in particular, their right to 
development in accordance with their own needs and interests, 
Recognizing the urgent need to respect and promote the inherent rights of indigenous 
peoples which derive from their political, economic and social structures and from 
their cultures, spiritual traditions, histories and philosophies, especially their rights to 
their lands, territories and resources, 
Recognizing also the urgent need to respect and promote the rights of indigenous 
peoples affirmed in treaties, agreements and other constructive arrangements with 
States, 
We/corning the fact that indigenous peoples are organizing themselves for political, 
economic, social and cultural enhancement and in order to bring to an end all forms of 
discrimination and oppression wherever they occur, 
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Convinced that control by indigenous peoples over developments affecting them and 
their lands, territories and resources will enable them to maintain and strengthen their 
institutions, cultures and traditions, and to promote their development in accordance 
with their aspirations and needs, 
Recognizing that respect for indigenous knowledge, cultures and traditional practices 
contributes to sustainable and equitable development and proper management of the 
environment, 
Emphasizing the contribution of the demilitarization of the lands and territories of 
indigenous peoples to peace, economic and social progress and development, 
understanding and friendly relations among nations and peoples of the world, 
Recognizing in particular the right of indigenous families and communities to retain 
shared responsibility for the upbringing, training, education and well-being of their 
children, consistent with the rights of the child, 
Considering that the rights affirmed in treaties, agreements and other constructive 
arrangements between States and indigenous peoples are, in some situations, matters 
of international concern, interest, responsibility and character, 
Considering also that treaties, agreements and other constructive arrangements, and 
the relationship they represent, are the basis for a strengthened partnership between 
indigenous peoples and States, 
Acknowledging that the Charter of the United Nations, the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights ' and the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights as well as the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action,2 affirm 
the fundamental importance of the right to self-determination of all peoples, by virtue 
of which they freel y determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, 
social and cultural development, 
1 See reso lution 2200 A (XXI), annex. 
1 /\/CONF. 157 /2-l (Part I), chap. III. 
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Bearing in mind that nothing in this Declaration may be used to deny any peoples 
their right to self-determination, exercised in conformity with international law, 
Convinced that the recognition of the rights of indigenous peoples in this Declaration 
will enhance harmonious and cooperative relations between the State and indigenous 
peoples, based on principles of justice, democracy, respect for human rights, non-
discrimination and good faith, 
Encouraging States to comply with and effectively implement all their obligations as 
they apply to indigenous peoples under international instruments, in particular those 
related to human rights, in consultation and cooperation with the peoples concerned, 
Emphasizing that the United Nations has an important and continuing role to play in 
promoting and protecting the rights of indigenous peoples, 
Believing that this Declaration is a further important step forward for the recognition, 
promotion and protection of the rights and freedoms of indigenous peoples and in the 
development ofrelevant activities of the United Nations system in this field, 
Recognizing and reaffirming that indigenous individuals are entitled without 
discrimination to all human rights recognized in international law, and that indigenous 
peoples possess collective rights which are indispensable for their existence, well-
being and integral development as peoples, 
Recognizing also that the situation of indigenous peoples varies from region to region 
and from country to country and that the significance of national and regional 
particularities and various historical and cultural backgrounds should be taken into 
consideration, 
Solemnly proclaims the following United Nations Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples as a standard of achievement to be pursued in a spirit of 
partnership and mutual respect: 
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Article I 
Indigenous peoples have the right to the full enjoyment, as a collective or as 
individuals, of all human rights and fundamental freedoms as recognized in the 
Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights3 and 
international human rights law. 
Article 2 
Indigenous peoples and individuals are free and equal to all other peoples and 
individuals and have the right to be free from any kind of discrimination, in the 
exercise of their rights, in particular that based on their indigenous origin or identity. 
Article 3 
Indigenous peoples have the right to self-determination. By virtue of that right they 
freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and 
cultural development. 
Article 4 
Indigenous peoples, in exercising their right to self-determination, have the right to 
autonomy or self-government in matters relating to their internal and local affairs, as 
well as ways and means for financing their autonomous functions . 
Article 5 
Indigenous peoples have the right to maintain and strengthen their distinct political, 
legal , economic, social and cultural institutions, while retaining their right to 
participate full y, if they so choose, in the political, economic, social and cultural life 
of the State. 
3 Resolution 2 17 A (III). 
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Article 6 
Every indigenous individual has the right to a nationality. 
Article 7 
1. Indigenous individuals have the rights to life, physical and mental integrity, liberty 
and security of person. 
2. Indigenous peoples have the collective right to live in freedom, peace and security 
as distinct peoples and shall not be subjected to any act of genocide or any other act of 
violence, including forcibly removing children of the group to another group. 
Article 8 
1. Indigenous peoples and individuals have the right not to be subjected to forced 
assimilation or destruction of their culture. 
2. States shall provide effective mechanisms for prevention of, and redress for: 
(a) Any action which has the aim or effect of depriving them of their integrity as 
distinct peoples, or of their cultural values or ethnic identities; 
(b) Any action which has the aim or effect of dispossessing them of their lands, 
territories or resources; 
( c) Any form of forced population transfer which has the aim or effect of violating or 
undermining any of their rights; 
( d) Any form of forced assimilation or integration; 
( e) Any form of propaganda designed to promote or incite racial or ethnic 
discrimination directed against them. 
Article 9 
Indigenous peoples and individuals have the right to belong to an indigenous 
community or nation, in accordance with the traditions and customs of the community 
or nation concerned. No discrimination of any kind may arise from the exercise of 
such a ri ght. 
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Article 10 
Indigenous peoples shall not be forcibly removed from their lands or territories. No 
relocation shall take place without the free, prior and informed consent of the 
indigenous peoples concerned and after agreement on just and fair compensation and, 
where possible, with the option ofreturn. 
Article 11 
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to practise and revitalize their cultural traditions 
and customs. This includes the right to maintain, protect and develop the past, present 
and future manifestations of their cultures, such as archaeological and historical sites, 
artefacts, designs, ceremonies, technologies and visual and performing arts and 
literature. 
2. States shall provide redress through effective mechanisms, which may include 
restitution, developed in conjunction with indigenous peoples, with respect to their 
cultural, intellectual, religious and spiritual property taken without their free, prior and 
informed consent or in violation of their laws, traditions and customs. 
Article 12 
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to manifest, practice, develop and teach their 
spiritual and religious traditions, customs and ceremonies; the right to maintain, 
protect, and have access in privacy to their religious and cultural sites; the right to the 
use and control of their ceremonial objects; and the right to the repatriation of their 
human remains. 
2. States shall seek to enable the access and/or repatriation of ceremonial objects and 
human remains in their possession through fair, transparent and effective mechanisms 
developed in conjunction with indigenous peoples concerned. 
Article 13 
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to revitalize, use, develop and transmit to future 
generations their histories, languages, oral traditions, philosophies, writing systems 
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and literatures, and to designate and retain their own names for communities, places 
and persons. 
2. States shall take effective measures to ensure that this right is protected and also to 
ensure that indigenous peoples can understand and be understood in political, legal 
and administrative proceedings, where necessary through the provision of 
interpretation or by other appropriate means. 
Article 14 
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to establish and control their educational systems 
and institutions providing education in their own languages, in a manner appropriate 
to their cultural methods of teaching and learning. 
2. Indigenous individuals, particularly children, have the right to all levels and forms 
of education of the State without discrimination. 
3. States shall, in conjunction with indigenous peoples, take effective measures, in 
order for indigenous individuals, particularly children, including those living outside 
their communities, to have access, when possible, to an education in their own culture 
and provided in their own language. 
Article 15 
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to the dignity and diversity of their cultures, 
traditions, histories and aspirations which shall be appropriately reflected in education 
and public information. 
2. States shall take effective measures, m consultation and cooperation with the 
indigenous peoples concerned, to combat prejudice and eliminate discrimination and 
to promote tolerance, understanding and good relations among indigenous peoples 
and all other segments of society. 
Article 16 
I . Indigenous peoples have the right to establish their own media in their own 
languages and to have access to all forms of non-indigenous media without 
discrimination. 
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2. States shall take effective measures to ensure that State-owned media duly reflect 
indigenous cultural diversity. States, without prejudice to ensuring full freedom of 
expression, should encourage privately owned media to adequately reflect indigenous 
cultural diversity. 
Article I 7 
1. Indigenous individuals and peoples have the right to enJoy fully all rights 
established under applicable international and domestic labour law. 
2. States shall in consultation and cooperation with indigenous peoples take specific 
measures to protect indigenous children from economic exploitation and from 
performing any work that is likely to be hazardous or to interfere with the child's 
education, or to be harmful to the child's health or physical, mental, spiritual, moral or 
social development, taking into account their special vulnerability and the importance 
of education for their empowerment. 
3. Indigenous individuals have the right not to be subjected to any discriminatory 
conditions oflabour and, inter alia, employment or salary. 
Article I 8 
Indigenous peoples have the right to participate in decision-making in matters which 
would affect their rights, through representatives chosen by themselves in accordance 
with their own procedures, as well as to maintain and develop their own indigenous 
decision-making institutions. 
Article I 9 
States shall consult and cooperate in good faith with the indigenous peoples 
concerned through their own representative institutions in order to obtain their free, 
prior and informed consent before adopting and implementing legislative or 
administrative measures that may affect them. 
78 
Article 20 
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to maintain and develop their political, economic 
and social systems or institutions, to be secure in the enjoyment of their own means of 
subsistence and development, and to engage freely in all their traditional and other 
economic activities. 
2. Indigenous peoples deprived of their means of subsistence and development are 
entitled to just and fair redress. 
Article 21 
1. Indigenous peoples have the right, without discrimination, to the improvement of 
their economic and social conditions, including, inter alia, in the areas of education, 
employment, vocational training and retraining, housing, sanitation, health and social 
security. 
2. States shall take effective measures and, where appropriate, special measures to 
ensure continuing improvement of their economic and social conditions. Particular 
attention shall be paid to the rights and special needs of indigenous elders, women, 
youth, children and persons with disabilities. 
Article 22 
1. Particular attention shall be paid to the rights and special needs of indigenous 
elders, women, youth, children and persons with disabilities in the implementation of 
this Declaration. 
2. States shall take measures, in conjunction with indigenous peoples, to ensure that 
indigenous women and children enjoy the full protection and guarantees against all 
forms of violence and discrimination. 
Article 23 
Indigenous peoples have the right to determine and develop priorities and strategies 
for exercising their right to development. In particular, indigenous peoples have the 
ri ght to be actively involved in developing and determining health, housing and other 
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economic and social programmes affecting them and, as far as possible, to administer 
such programmes through their own institutions. 
Article 24 
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to their traditional medicines and to maintain 
their health practices, including the conservation of their vital medicinal plants, 
animals and minerals. Indigenous individuals also have the right to access, without 
any discrimination, to all social and health services. 
2. Indigenous individuals have an equal right to the enjoyment of the highest 
attainable standard of physical and mental health. States shall take the necessary steps 
with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of this right. 
Article 25 
Indigenous peoples have the right to maintain and strengthen their distinctive spiritual 
relationship with their traditionally owned or otherwise occupied and used lands, 
territories, waters and coastal seas and other resources and to uphold their 
responsibilities to future generations in this regard. 
Article 26 
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to the lands, territories and resources which they 
have traditionally owned, occupied or otherwise used or acquired. 
2. Indigenous peoples have the right to own, use, develop and control the lands, 
territories and resources that they possess by reason of traditional ownership or other 
traditional occupation or use, as well as those which they have otherwise acquired. 
3. States shall give legal recognition and protection to these lands, territories and 
resources. Such recognition shall be conducted with due respect to the customs, 
traditions and land tenure systems of the indigenous peoples concerned. 
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Article 27 
States shall establish and implement, in conjunction with indigenous peoples 
concerned, a fair, independent, impartial, open and transparent process, giving due 
recognition to indigenous peoples' laws, traditions, customs and land tenure systems, 
to recognize and adjudicate the rights of indigenous peoples pertaining to their lands, 
territories and resources, including those which were traditionally owned or otherwise 
occupied or used. Indigenous peoples shall have the right to participate in this process. 
Article 28 
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to redress, by means that can include restitution 
or, when this is not possible, just, fair and equitable compensation, for the lands, 
territories and resources which they have traditionally owned or otherwise occupied or 
used, and which have been confiscated, taken, occupied, used or damaged without 
their free, prior and informed consent. 
2. Unless otherwise freely agreed upon by the peoples concerned, compensation shall 
take the form of lands, territories and resources equal in quality, size and legal status 
or of monetary compensation or other appropriate redress. 
Article 29 
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to the conservation and protection of the 
environment and the productive capacity of their lands or territories and resources. 
States shall establish and implement assistance programmes for indigenous peoples 
for such conservation and protection, without discrimination. 
2. States shall take effective measures to ensure that no storage or disposal of 
hazardous materials shall take place in the lands or territories of indigenous peoples 
without their free, prior and informed consent. 
3. States shall also take effective measures to ensure, as needed, that programmes for 
monitoring, maintaining and restoring the health of indigenous peoples, as developed 
and implemented by the peoples affected by such materials, are duly implemented. 
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Article 30 
1. Military activities shall not take place in the lands or territories of indigenous 
peoples, unless justified by a relevant public interest or otherwise freely agreed with 
or requested by the indigenous peoples concerned. 
2. States shall undertake effective consultations with the indigenous peoples 
concerned, through appropriate procedures and m particular through their 
representative institutions, prior to using their lands or territories for military 
activities. 
Article 31 
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to maintain, control, protect and develop their 
cultural heritage, traditional knowledge and traditional cultural expressions, as well as 
the manifestations of their sciences, technologies and cultures, including human and 
genetic resources, seeds, medicines, knowledge of the properties of fauna and flora, 
oral traditions, literatures, designs, sports and traditional games and visual and 
performing arts. They also have the right to maintain, control, protect and develop 
their intellectual property over such cultural heritage, traditional knowledge, and 
traditional cultural expressions. 
2. In conjunction with indigenous peoples, States shall take effective measures to 
recognize and protect the exercise of these rights. 
Article 32 
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to determine and develop priorities and strategies 
for the development or use of their lands or territories and other resources. 
2. States shall consult and cooperate in good faith with the indigenous peoples 
concerned through their own representative institutions in order to obtain their free 
and informed consent prior to the approval of any project affecting their lands or 
territories and other resources, particularly in connection with the development, 
utilization or exploitation of mineral, water or other resources. 
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3. States shall provide effective mechanisms for just and fair redress for any such 
activities, and appropriate measures shall be taken to mitigate adverse environmental, 
economic, social, cultural or spiritual impact. 
Article 33 
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to determine their own identity or membership in 
accordance with their customs and traditions. This does not impair the right of 
indigenous individuals to obtain citizenship of the States in which they live. 
2. Indigenous peoples have the right to determine the structures and to select the 
membership of their institutions in accordance with their own procedures. 
Article 34 
Indigenous peoples have the right to promote, develop and maintain their institutional 
structures and their distinctive customs, spirituality, traditions, procedures, practices 
and, in the cases where they exist, juridical systems or customs, in accordance with 
international human rights standards. 
Article 35 
Indigenous peoples have the right to determine the responsibilities of individuals to 
their communities. 
Article 36 
1. Indigenous peoples, in particular those divided by international borders, have the 
right to maintain and develop contacts, relations and cooperation, including activities 
for spiritual, cultural, political, economic and social purposes, with their own 
members as well as other peoples across borders. 
2. States, in consultation and cooperation with indigenous peoples, shall take effective 
measures to facilitate the exercise and ensure the implementation of this right. 
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Article 3 7 
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to the recognition, observance and enforcement 
of treaties, agreements and other constructive arrangements concluded with States or 
their successors and to have States honour and respect such treaties, agreements and 
other constructive arrangements. 
2. Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as diminishing or eliminating the 
rights of indigenous peoples contained in treaties, agreements and other constructive 
arrangements. 
Article 38 
States in consultation and cooperation with indigenous peoples, shall take the 
appropriate measures, including legislative measures, to achieve the ends of this 
Declaration. 
Article 39 
Indigenous peoples have the right to have access to financial and technical assistance 
from States and through international cooperation, for the enjoyment of the rights 
contained in this Declaration. 
Article 40 
Indigenous peoples have the right to access to and prompt decision through just and 
fair procedures for the resolution of conflicts and disputes with States or other parties, 
as well as to effective remedies for all infringements of their individual and collective 
rights. Such a decision shall give due consideration to the customs, traditions, rules 
and legal systems of the indigenous peoples concerned and international human 
rights. 
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Article 41 
The organs and specialized agencies of the United Nations system and other 
intergovernmental organizations shall contribute to the full realization of the 
provisions of this Declaration through the mobilization, inter alia, of financial 
cooperation and technical assistance. Ways and means of ensuring participation of 
indigenous peoples on issues affecting them shall be established. 
Article 42 
The United Nations, its bodies, including the Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, 
and specialized agencies, including at the country level, and States shall promote 
respect for and full application of the provisions of this Declaration and follow up the 
effectiveness of this Declaration. 
Article 43 
The rights recognized herein constitute the mm1mum standards for the survival, 
dignity and well-being of the indigenous peoples of the world. 
Article 44 
All the rights and freedoms recognized herein are equally guaranteed to male and 
female indigenous individuals. 
Article 45 
Nothing in this Declaration may be construed as diminishing or extinguishing the 
rights indigenous peoples have now or may acquire in the future. 
Article 46 
1. Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as implying for any State, people, 
group or person any right to engage in any activity or to perfo1m any act contrary to 
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the Charter of the United Nations or construed as authorizing or encouraging any 
action which would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or 
political unity of sovereign and independent States. 
2. In the exercise of the rights enunciated in the present Declaration, human rights and 
fundamental freedoms of all shall be respected. The exercise of the rights set forth in 
this Declaration shall be subject only to such limitations as are determined by law, and 
in accordance with international human rights obligations. Any such limitations shall 
be non-discriminatory and strictly necessary solely for the purpose of securing due 
recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and for meeting the just 
and most compelling requirements of a democratic society. 
3. The provisions set forth in this Declaration shall be interpreted in accordance with 
the principles of justice, democracy, respect for human rights, equality, non-
discrimination, good governance and good faith. 
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